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Reforming the Deﬁned-Beneﬁt
Pension System
IN SOME RESPECTS THE deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) pension system in the United
States is remarkably successful. In 2001 (the latest year for which data
from Form 5500 ﬁlings are available), roughly $130 billion was paid in
beneﬁts to 11 million recipients. DB plans in the aggregate held an esti-
mated $1.8 trillion in assets as security against future beneﬁt payments, and
in so doing made a large pool of capital available for efﬁcient deployment
through ﬁnancial markets.
1 Over the thirty-plus years since the founding
of the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the government cor-
poration that insures private sector DB plans, more than 168,000 plans have
been terminated, but only in about 3,500 of those cases has the PBGC had
to step in as trustee; in the other roughly 165,000 cases, plans had sufﬁcient
assets on hand to meet accrued obligations.
2 Even the often-cited $23 billion
negative net position on the PBGC’s balance sheet must be viewed in
context, as it represents only a small fraction of total beneﬁts paid since
the founding of the insurance program in 1974.
In many respects, however, the system is not working as well as it should.
One problem is that the system exposes some workers—those whose
235
DAVID W. WILCOX
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
I am grateful to Zvi Bodie, Jeremy Bulow, Jeffrey Brown, Edward DeMarco, Douglas
Elliott, Mark Iwry, Wendy Kiska, Nellie Liang, Deborah Lucas, Stephen Oliner, George
Pennacchi, Marvin Phaup, Paul Smith, and Jonathan Wright for helpful conversations and
comments on earlier drafts. Several of these individuals have been extraordinarily generous
with their time. I am also grateful to Blake Bailey for excellent research assistance. The
views expressed here are those of the author and are not necessarily shared by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System or the other members of its staff.
1. U.S. Department of Labor (2006).
2. PBGC (2005h, table S-3).benefits exceed the maximum amount guaranteed by the government
insurer—to a form of ﬁnancial risk that they likely are ill positioned to bear
and that they may not fully understand. In part the unsuitability of this risk
reﬂects the fact that pensions loom large relative to many workers’ ﬁnancial
portfolios. It also reﬂects the fact that a risky pension generally exposes
workers to own-ﬁrm risk. (The own-ﬁrm nature of the risk inherent in a less-
than-fully-secure DB plan arises because one of the preconditions of plan
termination is that the sponsor must be in bankruptcy proceedings.) For
some workers the downside of this risk has been realized: they have suf-
fered severe blows to their personal ﬁnancial situation when their employers
have terminated their DB plans with assets grossly insufficient to pay
accrued beneﬁts, and the PBGC covered only a portion of their loss.
A second problem with the current system is that mispriced PBGC
insurance coverage encourages excessive risk taking on the part of both
workers and ﬁrms. Julia Coronado and Nellie Liang ﬁnd that “even after
controlling for cash availability . . . ﬁrms closer to bankruptcy have funded
their plans much less generously.”
3 Anecdotally, other observers have cited
cases in which firms in shaky financial condition have granted benefit
increases in lieu of wage or salary increases, on the theory that if the for-
tunes of the ﬁrm improved, the ﬁrm would be able to meet the newly granted
pension obligations, and if not, the government insurance program would
step in to ﬁll the gap.
A third problem is that investors seem to have considerable difﬁculty
processing DB-related information accurately. For example, Coronado and
Steven Sharpe document that investors seem to be much more sensitive to
the smoothed information about pension items currently provided in the body
of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial statements than they are to the market-value-based esti-
mates provided in the footnotes.
4 Similarly, Francesco Franzoni and José
Marín show that ﬁrms with severely underfunded pension plans—a pub-
licly observable condition—tend to underperform the stock market.
5 This
misvaluation is a matter of macroeconomic concern because it raises the
possibility that capital is being misallocated across ﬁrms.
A fourth problem with the current system is that it puts taxpayers at risk
of providing substantial yet opaque subsidies to the sponsors and partici-
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3. Coronado and Liang (2005, p. 2).
4. Coronado and Sharpe (2003).
5. Franzoni and Marín (2006).pants of DB plans, beyond the $23 billion already reﬂected on the balance
sheet of the federal insurer. In particular, the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce
(CBO) estimates that the insurance provided by the PBGC will be under-
priced by $63 billion over the next ten years if current law is left in place.
6
This commitment of resources would come just as other demands on the
federal government associated with the retirement of the baby-boom gen-
eration are mounting.
A ﬁfth problem is that healthy sponsors confront a real risk that costs
will be shifted to them from weaker sponsors. Such a shift would occur
if, in an effort to recoup the economic losses already incurred or still in
prospect, policymakers were to raise PBGC premiums (which, by construc-
tion, are paid only by surviving sponsors) above their economically fair
level. A move in this direction would give surviving sponsors an added
incentive to bring their plans up to fully funded status and then terminate
them, and could therefore deplete the ranks of DB plan sponsors, not
because of any inherent flaw in the system or lack of perceived value in
DB pensions as a form of compensation, but rather because the costs of
sponsorship had been inﬂated beyond their full and fair level.
One last problem with the status quo is that all sponsors face a regu-
latory thicket of mind-boggling proportions. One example among many
involves the method (which figure 1 attempts to illustrate) that sponsors
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Figure 1. Determination of the Maximum Deductible Contribution
Normal cost plus ten-year 







Maximum of Maximum of OBRA 1987 FFL
RPA 1994 override FFL
Unfunded current liability
Source: PBGC.
Note: OBRA 1987, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987; RPA 1994, Retirement Protection Act of 1994.must use to determine the maximum contribution they will be allowed to
deduct against their income taxes. The basic idea is that sponsors should
be allowed to deduct the amount that would be required to boost the plan
to fully funded status—but not more, because of the losses to the Treasury
that would be associated with such “excess” contributions. As the ﬁgure
makes evident, however, the basic idea is deeply obscured in the current
implementation. Needless complexity in the rules governing DB plans
adds cost to the system and therefore discourages sponsorship.
In light of these shortcomings of the current system, this paper puts for-
ward a comprehensive package of reforms with the goal of reviving the
existing private DB system.
7 Given the speed with which that system seems
to be shrinking, however, one might well ask, “why bother?” Fundamen-
tally, two reasons argue for undertaking such a program of reform even at
this late date: First, even if conventional DB plans are doomed to extinction,
considerable time will be required to unwind the plans still in existence, and
the advantages of navigating that unwinding under better rules rather than
worse ones could be substantial. Second, the demise of the DB system is
hardly a foregone conclusion. Although a number of high-profile freezes
and terminations have occurred recently, most large sponsors have pre-
served their plans thus far. Under streamlined rules, a greater number of
firms and workers might decide that a DB plan should be retained as part
of the overall compensation package.
The shortcomings described above motivate the adoption of three axioms
concerning characteristics that an improved pension system should have.
8
These axioms play a crucial role in the logic of the paper, because the
reform proposal that the paper puts forward is derived from them. The ﬁrst
axiom is that workers should be able to view the promise of a DB pension
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7. In addition to single-employer plans (plans sponsored by a single ﬁrm), the PBGC
insures multiemployer plans, which involve, as the name implies, more than one employer
and are usually created as part of a collective bargaining agreement. Such plans often cover
multiple employers in the same industry within a given geographic region and allow workers
to migrate from one employer to another while continuing to accrue beneﬁts in the same plan.
(See PBGC, “Multiemployer Insurance Program,” www.pbgc.gov/media/key-resources-for-
the-press/content/page13544.html.) This paper focuses on the single-employer insurance
program because the vast majority of the liability currently recognized by the PBGC arises
from that segment of its operations.
8. The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary deﬁnes an axiom as “a statement accepted
as true as the basis for argument or inference.”as free of risk.9 This axiom is intended to address the facts that many
workers are not well positioned to bear ﬁnancial risk on the scale posed by
an underfunded pension promise and that a risky pension scheme almost
always entails meaningful own-ﬁrm risk.
10 If workers understand the nature
of that risk, they will offer their employer a lower “price” (in the form of
wage and salary concessions) than the capital markets would offer in
return for the same cash ﬂow, because, as Lawrence Bader has noted,
“employees cannot diversify or hedge this risk in any practical manner,”
whereas capital markets can do so easily.
11 Zvi Bodie has referred to the
difference between what workers and capital markets would offer in
return for pension cash ﬂows as “a wedge of dead-weight loss” that the
employer can eliminate by making the DB promise free of risk.
12 Another
realistic possibility is that workers simply do not understand the nature of
the risk they are assuming by accepting a less-than-fully-secure DB plan,
and so are not fairly compensated for it.
13
Some analysts have argued that risky DB promises serve an economi-
cally and socially useful purpose, in that they give workers a stake in the
economic success of their employer. But the objective of aligning the
economic interests of workers with those of their firms can be advanced
more directly and more transparently using other forms of compensation,
such as employee stock ownership plans and long-dated options, which
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9. Bodie (2003) argues the same proposition on the basis of much the same logic as is
used here. See, for example, the title of his section 3: “Corporate deﬁned beneﬁt promises
should be free of default risk.”
10. The case for rendering the pension promise risk-free is more compelling, the more
highly correlated is human capital with the ﬁnancial health of the ﬁrm, and the less highly
correlated is the ﬁnancial health of the ﬁrm with the overall performance of the business
sector. If a worker’s human capital is perfectly transferable from one ﬁrm to another, that
worker may suffer little or no direct adverse ﬁnancial consequences in the event that the
employer goes into bankruptcy (leaving aside the issue of the funding status of the DB plan).
If a ﬁrm’s entry into bankruptcy can be predicted perfectly from the performance of the
aggregate stock market, then, in a sense, no “own-ﬁrm” risk inheres in the pension promise,
risky or not.
11. Bader (2004, p. 15).
12. Bodie (2003, p. 66).
13. In the opening sentences of his 1987 article, Ippolito suggests (p. 15) that at least part
of the motivation for the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was precisely
to reinforce the security of the pension promise: “Congress enacted [ERISA] in 1974 to
reduce the long-term risk inherent in private pensions. Advertised as a major piece of worker-
protection legislation, it was designed to convert pensions from conditional promises into
the equivalent of wages.”also have the important advantage of not involving the taxpayer as a
third-party guarantor. An alternative argument that might be made in
favor of a risk-tolerant approach is that, left to their own devices, work-
ers might reasonably choose a risky pension over a safe one in order to
gain some exposure to equity risk. But, again, conventional ﬁnance theory
suggests that a well-informed worker should have little or no appetite for
the particular form of risk exposure inherent in an underfunded DB plan,
because it involves a heavy dose of own-firm risk even if the pension
trust is invested entirely in a well-diversiﬁed portfolio. Moreover, to the
extent that workers succeed in capturing the value associated with any
upside risk in the net worth of the plan, one might expect employers
either to trim other forms of compensation or to arrange the assets of the
plan so as to reduce or eliminate that upside risk. If pension plans were to
be charged an economically fair insurance premium that reflected the
market price of all aspects of risk borne by the insurer, and thus the
excess value derived at the expense of the PBGC were to be removed,
workers’ appetites for pension risk would probably be further dimin-
ished. And if general equity exposure is the objective, a 401(k) plan is a
more appropriate tool.
The second axiom is that taxpayers should be compensated in full at
market-consistent rates for the risk that they shoulder in backstopping
the federal pension insurance program. As noted above, failure to assess
a rational premium motivates sponsors and workers to take on risks they
would not otherwise, exposes taxpayers to considerable ﬁnancial burden
at a time of mounting demands on government, and provides a substantial
and opaque subsidy. Again, some analysts have argued to the contrary—
that the Congress fully intended to set up a system that would transfer
resources to ﬁrms in distress. But alternative mechanisms (such as unem-
ployment insurance and various forms of worker education and training)
are available that might better serve the purpose of cushioning the eco-
nomic blow inevitably experienced by some workers and firms in a
dynamic economy.
The third axiom is that low-risk sponsors should not have to cross-
subsidize the insurance coverage provided to their high-risk counterparts.
Sponsorship of a DB plan is voluntary, and low-risk sponsors perceiving
a threat that costs might be shifted from distressed ﬁrms to them could be
moved to terminate plans they might otherwise maintain. Genuine insur-
ance can be provided without cross-subsidization.
240 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2006Readers who disagree with any of these three axioms, and therefore
posit different ones, will reach different conclusions from those derived
here.
14 Equally, readers who ﬁnd the implications of these three axioms
unacceptable must, as a matter of logic, be willing to identify at least one
axiom they would be willing to compromise.
In aiming to minimize the risk in the pension promise, the proposed
reforms will deliberately build in a degree of redundancy. For example,
although one might argue that a sufﬁciently stringent set of funding re-
quirements would be enough, on its own, to render the pension promise
free of risk, this paper recommends that such funding requirements be
complemented with  market-mimicking insurance premiums and en-
hanced disclosure to investors and workers. The purpose of this redun-
dancy is to provide multiple layers of protection against failure: If the
funding rules do not work exactly as intended, the market-based premi-
ums might still motivate ﬁrms to adopt a risk-free stance. And if both of
those layers failed, well-informed workers might still encourage ﬁrms to
provide full security on their pension promises, and well-informed
investors might encourage better matching of assets and liabilities once
the associated risk is fully appreciated. On the other hand, if an ideal set
of funding rules were implemented and succeeded in squeezing pension
risk essentially to zero, then a well-designed approach to pricing insurance
would likewise squeeze the risk-based component of the premiums essen-
tially to zero, ensuring no unnecessary cost from this element of redun-
dancy. In the end, a sponsor that encountered severe ﬁnancial difﬁculty
would still be able to cut costs by terminating its pension plan; but if the
proposals laid out here worked as intended, the sponsor would leave
behind a set of pension promises that could be fulfilled in their entirety,
with no loss by workers of benefits already accrued, no cost to the tax-
payer, and no shifting of financial responsibility to surviving sponsors.
This paper can be viewed as representing the ﬁrst step in a wider pro-
gram. It maps one set of axioms onto their implications, but it obviously
does not provide a complete mapping from all possible axioms onto their
implications. Nor, more fundamentally, does it derive the axioms from a
formal and reasonably realistic model of optimizing behavior on the part of
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14. As the discussion below will make clear, the three axioms are taken as conceptual
objectives toward which great progress can be made, but not as ends that must be achieved
at all cost.workers, ﬁrms, and taxpayers.15 (In this context a reasonably realistic model
would be capable of explaining such phenomena as the seeming inability
even of equity market participants to accurately infer the implications of
information about DB plans for the market value of their sponsors, and the
apparent willingness of many workers to increase their exposure to own-
ﬁrm risk even beyond that implicit in their investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital.) Policymakers must make decisions that reﬂect the full
complexity of the real world, including all the considerations that have been
swept aside here. In principle, those considerations could cause policy-
makers to arrive at quite different conclusions about the appropriate regu-
latory structure from the ones derived here.
The paper should not be viewed as advocating that workers should be
provided risk-free annuities as part of their compensation. Rather, it should
be viewed as stipulating that DB pensions should remain as one of the
compensation tools available to workers and management as they work out
the value-maximizing means of delivering compensation to workers. The
paper derives the implications of attaching an important caveat to the use of
DB pensions, namely, that if workers are to be promised annuities by their
employers, and if taxpayers are to be interposed as third-party guarantors
of those annuities, then the pension promise should be essentially free of
risk so as to avoid imposing yet more own-ﬁrm risk on workers who may
already be holding too much of it. In the course of bargaining with their
employers, workers should of course be careful not to demand too large a
fraction of their overall compensation in the form of such risk-free annu-
ities, taking account of whatever Social Security beneﬁts they might
become entitled to. Equity-related compensation and own-ﬁrm-risk-
related compensation may be complementary elements of the compensation
toolbox, but other vehicles aside from DB plans are available for the purpose
of giving workers exposure to those forms of risk. The salient common
feature of those other forms of compensation is that they all transparently
do not involve the government as guarantor, and they are much more trans-
parent in the manner in which they expose workers to equity risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The ﬁrst section
provides a short course in DB plans, with the objective of giving the non-
specialist enough of a toehold on the institutional detail of the system to
follow the remainder of the discussion. The next section then brieﬂy pro-
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15. This is the objective of research in progress.vides a theoretical perspective on three issues of central importance to
the regulation of pensions: the concept of liability that sponsors should
be required to take as their funding objective; the discount rate that spon-
sors should use in estimating that liability; and the optimal composition of
the portfolio of pension assets. The next section returns from theory to the
real world, aiming to summarize what is known from practical experi-
ence about the real sources of vulnerability in the current system. In par-
ticular, this section attempts to identify the features of current law that
have been most instrumental in allowing risk to persist for workers, tax-
payers, and healthy sponsors. The objective of this section is to ensure that
the reform proposals put forward in this paper actually address and would
resolve the fundamental problems currently afﬂicting DB plans. The next
section puts forward the proposed reform program, touching on funding
requirements, portfolio investment restrictions, insurance premium pric-
ing, and transparency. This is a case where the details matter, because if
the reforms outlined here are to be credible, they must engage with the DB
system as it currently exists. Accordingly, the section goes into substan-
tially greater depth, as needed, about the design of the current system. The
penultimate section looks many years down the road. It takes as given that
the government will always have an important role as standards setter, as
monitor, and as the entity that mandates that pension sponsors insure their
pension obligations. However, this section raises the question of whether
the government must always remain the provider of that insurance, even
long after a program of reforms like the one recommended here—designed
to substantially eliminate the risk in pension promises—has been put into
place. The ﬁnal section concludes.
A Crash Course in Deﬁned-Beneﬁt Pension Plans
The textbook DB plan promises each worker covered by the plan a retire-
ment annuity that is determined as a certain percentage (say, 1
1⁄2 percent)
multiplied by the worker’s number of years of service multiplied by the
worker’s final average salary (perhaps the average over the last three or
five years of service).
16 Two other types of benefits are discussed less
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16. Compact and readable summaries of many of the provisions discussed in this section
are provided in U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Taxation (2005), CBO (2005a), and Center
on Federal Financial Institutions (2004).frequently in the economics literature but are disproportionately impor-
tant from the perspective of the PBGC and will ﬁgure in the recommen-
dations  put forward below. First, some plans determine promised
benefits as a function of years of service only, rather than years of service
and salary; some analysts (for example, the Government Accountability
Office, or GAO) refer to such plans as “ﬂat-beneﬁt plans,” whereas others
(for example, Dan McGill) call them “speciﬁed dollar beneﬁt plans.”
17
Beneﬁts in such plans keep pace with prices or nominal compensation
only if the nominal amount paid per year of service is adjusted over time.
Although such adjustments may occur regularly, they cannot—by law—be
prefunded within the plan. As a result, beneﬁt increases in these plans
automatically generate new unfunded liability, which under present fund-
ing rules may be amortized over thirty years, leaving ample time for
sponsors to run aground before the promised beneﬁts have been funded.
18
In a study of forty-four plans that terminated between 1986 and 1988 (and
accounted for 96 percent of the total unfunded liability assumed by the
PBGC during those three years), the GAO estimated that flat-benefit
plans accounted for $2.4 billion, or nearly 90 percent of the $2.7 billion
in total unfunded liability taken over by the PBGC during that period.
19
The second, relatively unfamiliar form of beneﬁts is shutdown beneﬁts,
which are payable in the wake of an event such as a plant closing or per-
manent layoff. These beneﬁts may provide access to unreduced retirement
benefits at an early age and are no doubt especially important to older
workers who, on average, would have a more difﬁcult time transitioning
to new employment. The problem with shutdown beneﬁts insofar as the
ﬁnancial viability of the PBGC is concerned is that they are generally not
prefunded, because only the expected present value of shutdown beneﬁts
is included in plan liabilities, and shutdowns are generally assumed for
purposes of computing funding requirements to have zero probability of
occurring until they have actually happened.
20 In a 2003 report the GAO
244 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2006
17. GAO (1992); McGill and others (2005, p. 244).
18. If the ratio of assets to liabilities falls below a certain level (90 percent in some
cases, 80 percent in others), the plan faces an additional funding requirement intended to speed
the amortization of the unfunded liability.
19. GAO (1992, p. 36, note 1). The GAO did not speciﬁcally examine the contribution
to total insurance losses of recent increases in beneﬁts at these plans. Ippolito (2004) also
underscores the importance of ﬂat-beneﬁt plans in generating exposure for the PBGC.
20. GAO (1992, p. 27).stated that the “PBGC estimates that it could become responsible for over
$15 billion in shutdown beneﬁts in PBGC-insured plans,” suggesting that
shutdown benefits are a noticeable but not predominant source of the
PBGC’s unsustainable ﬁnancial position.
21 Although shutdown beneﬁts are
not generally prefunded, they may be fully guaranteed by the PBGC so
long as the provision allowing for payment of such beneﬁts had been in
place at least ﬁve years before the shutdown event.
22
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), private
sponsors of DB plans face a welter of regulations governing the minimum
contributions they must make to prefund their future retirement obliga-
tions. In broad-brush terms, the idea of these regulations is to ensure that
sponsors contribute enough each year both to cover that year’s beneﬁt
accruals (“normal cost” as discussed below) and to amortize a fraction of
any gap that may have opened up between assets and liabilities. Certain
sponsors—those already in bankruptcy or whose plans are already very
deeply underfunded—also face restrictions on their ability to increase
promised beneﬁts. In addition, ERISA requires the ﬁduciary of a DB plan
to invest the plan’s assets in a diversified manner, but it imposes no
requirement that the value of the plan’s assets be correlated with the value
of its liabilities. Anecdotally, the asset manager is typically instructed
only to maximize the expected rate of return on assets for a given level of
risk. From the perspective of conventional ﬁnance theory, the failure of
such instructions to take any account of the characteristics of plan 
liabilities is odd.
Rules governing the methods that ﬁrms must use to report pension-related
information in their ﬁnancial statements are set by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB).
23 Broadly, pension expense is calculated each
period as pension beneﬁts accrued during the period, plus the imputed
cost of ﬁnancing the outstanding pension obligation (calculated using the
assumed discount rate), minus the expected return on plan assets, plus the
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21. GAO (2003a, p. 26).
22. Shutdown beneﬁts, like other beneﬁts, are subject to three distinct forms of guaran-
tee limits. One of these—the one limiting the guaranteeable amount to the normal retire-
ment beneﬁt under the plan—is especially pertinent in the case of shutdown beneﬁts, which
may promise a temporary supplement in addition to an unreduced beneﬁt to workers who
have not yet reached the normal retirement age.
23. The requirements are set in Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 87, which was
promulgated in 1985. A summary is available at www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum87.shtml.amortization of past discrepancies between actual and expected returns and
other adjustments such as changes in actuarial assumptions or amendments
to plan provisions. The aspect of this treatment that has attracted the most
controversy is the fact that sponsors are allowed to report a smoothed
version of plan results on their income statement rather than having to reﬂect
changes in the fair market value of assets and liabilities immediately.
24
The PBGC insures DB plan beneﬁts only up to certain limits, speciﬁed in
law and detailed below. Both single-employer and multiemployer plans are
currently deeply underfunded in the aggregate (with underfunding exceeding
$200 billion for multiemployer plans, compared with more than $450 billion
for single-employer plans).
25 However, under the multiemployer insurance
program, the maximum guaranteed beneﬁt is much lower, and employers
are jointly liable for the promised beneﬁts.
26 Consequently, the PBGC has
accumulated a much larger negative net ﬁnancial position under the single-
employer program ($23 billion as of September 30, 2005, as noted above)
than under the multiemployer program ($335 million). The PBGC is sup-
posed to be self-ﬁnancing, and its insurance function explicitly is not backed
by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury.
27
ERISA sets rules governing the permissible means of terminating a DB
plan. If a plan is fully funded, the sponsor may close out its obligations
by purchasing sufficient annuities from a private insurance company to
pay participants their accrued beneﬁts, or by making lump-sum payments
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24. See Coronado and Sharpe (2003). FASB is on track to require sponsors to report
market value-based estimates of their pension assets and liabilities on the balance sheet itself
rather than in the footnotes. Even after this step has been completed, however, the income
statement will still be based on smoothed estimates rather than current market values, and
the balance sheet estimates will take account of projected increases in wages and salaries,
whereas a case can be made (and is made below) that such projections should be ignored.
FASB intends to address the treatment of the income statement in a multiyear project due
for completion later this decade.
25. PBGC (2005a).
26. Under the multiemployer program, the maximum guaranteed beneﬁt depends on
the employee’s years of service; at present, for a participant with thirty years of service, the
maximum guaranteed beneﬁt is $12,780 a year, only about one-quarter the maximum that
can be guaranteed under the single-employer program. (See PBGC, “Multiemployer Insurance
Program,” www.pbgc.gov/media/key-resources-for-the-press/content/page13544.html.) On
employer liability under the multiemployer program, see Center on Federal Financial Insti-
tutions (2004, p. 2).
27. ERISA §4002(g)(2) states that “the United States is not liable for any obligation or
liability incurred by the corporation [PBGC].”to participants; this type of action is referred to as a “standard termination.”
If a plan is underfunded, the sponsor may terminate it only if the sponsor is
in bankruptcy proceedings—either for liquidation or for reorganization—
or has persuaded the PBGC that the sponsor would be unable to pay its
debts when due and would be “unable to continue in business” unless the
plan is terminated, or that the costs of funding the plan have become
“unreasonably burdensome” solely because of a decline in the workforce
of the sponsor.
28 For its part the PBGC may terminate a plan if it deter-
mines that the “possible long-run loss of the [PBGC] with respect to the
plan may reasonably be expected to increase unreasonably if the plan is
not terminated.”
29
The extent of the PBGC guarantee is limited in several ways.30 The
restriction with the greatest practical effect is the one that limits the PBGC
guarantee to a certain age-related amount per year. For example, for plans
terminating in 2006, benefits will be guaranteed only up to $47,659 a
year for a participant beginning to draw benefits from the PBGC at age
sixty-five (no matter when that person turns sixty-five), and only up to
$30,978 for a participant beginning to draw beneﬁts from the PBGC at
age sixty (no matter when that person turns sixty).
31 A second limitation
on the PBGC guarantee excludes a fraction of benefit improvements
implemented within the five years preceding termination: “For benefit
David W. Wilcox 247
28. 29 U.S.C. §1341(c)(2)(B)(iii)(I, II). The requirements for distress termination are
enumerated elsewhere in 29 U.S.C. §1341(c)(2)(B). The conditions for involuntary termi-
nation are spelled out in §1342. In its original form, ERISA did not formally require a spon-
sor to demonstrate that it was experiencing ﬁnancial distress before it could put its pension
obligations to the PBGC. According to Weaver (1997, p. 146), McGill and others (2005,
pp. 806–07, 819), and the CBO (2005a, p. 10), a sponsor could virtually at will put the oblig-
ations of the plan to the PBGC in return for 30 percent of the net worth of the ﬁrm. However,
Boyce and Ippolito (2002, p. 122) state that, notwithstanding the absence of a formal statu-
tory provision so requiring, “in fact, bankruptcy always has been the condition under which the
underfunding could be put to the PBGC. This reality was codiﬁed in the Pension Protection
Act [PPA] of 1987.” In a study of plan terminations that occurred between 1983 and 1985, the
GAO (1987) found that 96 percent of claims came from sponsors that would have met the
distress criteria enshrined in law by the PPA.
29. ERISA §4042(a)(4). Note that 29 U.S.C. §1342 also includes other criteria for
involuntary termination.
30. See PBGC (2000) for a helpful description and analysis of these beneﬁt limitations.
31. PBGC (2005e). The maximum guaranteed amount for plans terminating in 2007
will be marked up according to the rate of change in the same wage index used to escalate
the maximum taxable wage amount in the Social Security program.improvements that became effective (or that the sponsor adopted, if later)
more than one year but less than ﬁve years before the plan’s termination,
the PBGC will guarantee the larger of 20 percent of the beneﬁt increase or
$20 a month for each full year the increase was in effect.”
32 A third
restriction causes the PBGC guarantee to exclude amounts in excess of
what the participant would have received from a straight life annuity
drawn at the plan’s normal retirement age. These limits on guaranteed
amounts imply that, even with the backing provided by the PBGC, some
workers are at risk of losing beneﬁts in the event of sponsor bankruptcy.
33
In return for this insurance, plan sponsors pay the PBGC an annual
premium, which is calculated in two parts: a ﬂat-rate premium now equal
to $30 per participant in the plan (indexed for wage inﬂation beginning in
2007), plus a variable-rate premium equal to $9 per $1,000 of unfunded
vested liability.
34 In practice most unfunded liability is exempted from the
variable-rate premium, and so income derived from that provision is far
less than 0.9 percent of unfunded liability.
The assets of the PBGC are derived from premium income, assets taken
over from terminated plans, and recoveries from employers. The PBGC
invests its portfolio almost entirely in a mix of Treasury securities and
equities. The investment policy of the PBGC has ﬂuctuated over time; at
times it has sought a substantial exposure to equity risk; at other times it
has placed much greater emphasis on matching the characteristics of its
assets to its liabilities, thereby reducing risk.
The PBGC effectively defines its liability as the price it would have
to pay a private entity to assume the financial obligations associated
with terminated plans; this concept of liability is known as “termination
liability.” The PBGC’s methodology for estimating termination liability
depends importantly on a survey conducted by the American Council of
Life Insurers, in which insurance companies are asked to price a range of
immediate and deferred life annuities. The PBGC uses these annuity prices
to infer a pair of discount rates (one applicable for the ﬁrst twenty or twenty-
ﬁve years, the other applicable thereafter) by ﬁrst positing a mortality table
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32. PBGC (2000, p. 11).
33. Although the PBGC guarantees beneﬁts only up to these amounts, it may pay more
than the guaranteed amounts if sufﬁcient assets are available (including not only the assets
of the plan but also any recoveries from the employer).
34. See PBGC, “PBGC Premiums Rise with Enactment of Budget Reconciliation Bill”
(www.pbgc.gov/media/news-archive/2006/pr06-26.html).and then choosing the two discount rates that best explain the observed
annuity prices.
35 Figure 2 compares the resulting near-term annuity rate
with the Aa corporate bond rate—representative of what many corporate
sponsors use in preparing their ﬁnancial statements—as well as the corri-
dor of rates from which sponsors were allowed to choose in calculating
required plan contributions. The annuity rate is systematically below the
Aa rate but tracks its movements reasonably closely. Between late 2000
and early 2004, however, the annuity rate moved down noticeably more
than the Aa rate, implying that, over that period, interest rate declines
boosted termination liability by an especially large amount.
36
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35. Helpful descriptions of the PBGC’s methodology with regard to termination liability
are contained in PBGC (2005b) and GAO (2003d, pp. 24–25).
36. An implication of the PBGC’s methodology for measuring termination liability is
that the appropriateness of the discount rates used by the PBGC generally cannot be judged in
isolation (see PBGC, 2005b, p. 3); one must take account of all the factors inﬂuencing annuity
prices, including not only discount rates but also assumptions about mortality, lump-sum
payments, and early retirement, to name a few. The sample period shown in ﬁgure 2 is an
exception, because during that period the PBGC was using the same mortality table that
private sponsors were required to use in calculating their minimum required contribution;
in addition, many private sponsors were using the same table (or one not too unlike it) for
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Percent
Range of admissible rates, required contributionsa
Aa corporate bond rate
Survey-derived 
PBGC rate
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Moody's Investors Service.
a. In computing required contributions, firms must choose a discount rate from a range of admissible rates. In computing 
termination liability they must use the survey-derived PBGC rate. In their financial statements they generally use a rate similar to 
the Aa corporate bond rate.
Figure 2. Alternative Discount Rates for Calculating Pension LiabilityIn the federal budget the premium income and some investment income
of the PBGC are recognized as revenue upon receipt; beneﬁt payments and
administrative expenses are treated as outlays insofar as they are deemed
to have been funded out of premium income (and the investment income
derived therefrom) rather than out of assets recovered from plan sponsors.
This budgetary treatment has some unfortunate implications, to be dis-
cussed later in the paper.
Some Theory
As additional background for the design of reforms to the current system,
this section presents some simple theory pertaining to three issues that
have been much debated among pension analysts: the concept of liability
that sponsors should be required to take as their funding objective; the
discount rate that sponsors should use in estimating that liability; and the
optimal composition of the portfolio of pension assets. The section builds
directly on the three axioms stated in the introduction: that the pension
promise should be essentially free of risk; that taxpayers should be fully
compensated for bearing any residual risk; and that healthy sponsors should
not be at risk of having to subsidize unhealthy ones.
What Measure of Liability?
Two main competing measures of a plan sponsor’s liability have been
put forward. The ﬁrst is known as the accumulated beneﬁt obligation, or
ABO. The ABO is computed by determining the beneﬁts to which each
employee would be entitled at retirement based on current years of service
and current salary, and then discounting these beneﬁts back to the present.
The other main gauge of liability is known as the projected beneﬁt obliga-
tion, or PBO. The PBO is computed by forecasting future increases in
salaries (but not years of service), computing the beneﬁts implied by those
forecasts, and then discounting those beneﬁts back to the present. The
choice of liability measure is important because it determines both the
funding objective and the stochastic characteristics of liabilities (which
determine, in turn, the characteristics of the risk-immunizing portfolio
of assets). Box 1 further explores the complicated measurement of plan
liability.
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Box 1. One Concept, Many Measures: The Different Methods of Calculating
Plan Liability under Current Law
A multitude of different measures of pension plan liability exist, each built up
from different assumptions and used for a different purpose. For example, each
of several different measures of liability requires that different discount rates
be used in their computation:
—Two measures of liability—the one used to determine the basic minimum
required contribution, and the one used to determine whether an additional
funding requirement is to be assessed—must be computed using a discount rate
chosen from within a permissible range.
—The measure of liability that is used to assess susceptibility to the variable-
rate premium must be computed using a specific discount rate tied to the
Treasury rate.
—The measure of liability that ﬁrms report in their ﬁnancial statements is
computed using a discount rate of the sponsor’s own choosing, usually tied to an
index of rates on high-quality corporate bonds.
—The measure of liability used by the PBGC to assess its own net ﬁnancial
position is constructed using a discount rate derived from a survey of insur-
ance companies regarding the prices they charge for annuities.
Figure 2 shows how these different discount rates rose and fell between 1995
and 2004—the period when, for reasons described in the text, head-to-head
comparisons of this type are valid. The differences in movements between these
rates, of course, cause the corresponding liability measures to behave differently.
Other factors that are important in determining the various estimates of liability
differ as well.
The quantitative differences among the various measures can be substantial.
Most strikingly, the pension plans at General Motors were underfunded in the
aggregate by $31 billion as of the end of June 2005, on a termination liability
basis, even though the company’s Form 10-K reported them as overfunded
by $3 billion at the end of 2004 (Mary Williams Walsh and Danny Hakim,
“G.M. and a U.S. Agency See Pensions in Different Lights,” The New York
Times, October 5, 2005, p. C.1). In general, the differences among the various
deﬁnitions of liability cannot easily be explained as reﬂecting efforts to
answer different underlying economic questions. Apparently, no compre-
hensive study has been undertaken to identify the most important causes of
the discrepancies between the various measures of liability.At ﬁrst blush the PBO seems attractive as a measure of the ﬁrm’s true
economic liability, because it recognizes that, in all probability, at least
some workers will remain employed by the ﬁrm beyond the present and
so will experience further increases in salary; the PBO also reflects the
conservative assumption that the plan will be operated on its current terms
into the indeﬁnite future. Indeed, some eminent scholars including Fischer
Black as well as Deborah Lucas and Stephen Zeldes have argued that ﬁrms
may appropriately choose to hedge a PBO-based measure of liability.
37 On
the other hand, Jeremy Bulow and Bodie, among others, have argued that
the ABO is the better measure.
38 The argument on behalf of the ABO begins
with the observation that if the labor market operated exactly according to
the simplest classical model, clearing continuously on the basis of total
compensation per worker and with perfect competition, the ABO would
be exactly the appropriate economic measure of a ﬁrm’s liabilities. In the
classical model the ﬁrm pays its workers their marginal product, period by
period. The ﬁrm has no incentive to hedge against future ﬂuctuations in any
component of compensation, because it is already perfectly hedged against
ﬂuctuations in the whole of compensation. One might be concerned that
the ABO approach would expose ﬁrms to undue ﬁnancial stress as their
workforces age. But if labor markets clear each period on the basis of total
compensation, the high rate of beneﬁt accruals associated with a workforce
disproportionately made up of workers near retirement would be offset by
slow growth of wages and salaries. Because pension costs are typically a
small fraction of total compensation, only a small adjustment in salary is
generally required to accommodate ﬂuctuations in pension cost due to
changing demographics.
39
Bulow concedes that if a certain form of implicit contract bound the
future actions of workers and ﬁrms, the PBO would be the better measure
of pension liability. But, on a number of grounds, he expresses skepticism
about the likely relevance of such contracts. Furthermore, he argues that
even if such contracts did exist, the generosity of a firm’s DB plan might
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37. Black (1980, 1989); Lucas and Zeldes (2006).
38. Bulow (1982); Bodie (1990b).
39. A separate argument for the ABO is that ﬁrms offering a deﬁned-contribution plan
use the ABO approach without controversy. For example, a ﬁrm that matches its employees’
contributions and automatically steps up their contribution rates each year unless they opt out
would account for the cost of the plan on a current basis; it would not use a forecast-based
accrual pattern reﬂecting the trajectory of a typical employee.be a poor guide to the empirical importance of the implicit contract at
that firm.
Ultimately, the net implication of the choice between ABO and PBO for
the risk that plans present to workers and the PBGC may not be too great:
If the ABO were the economically correct concept but the PBO were
nonetheless adopted as the legal standard, the funding objective would
generally be higher than with the ABO, providing an extra barrier against
risk. On the other hand, the adoption of the PBO as the funding standard
might also be taken as justiﬁcation for investing part of the pension trust
in equities, as a hedge against future salary risk. But investing part of the
trust in equities would move the portfolio away from immunizing the
ABO—a step that would, all else equal, increase risk. Which of these two
inﬂuences would predominate is not clear.
What Discount Rate?
If the ABO is the funding objective, the liabilities of a plan at any given
moment are known in nominal terms, up to demographic risk. If it is further
stipulated that demographic risk is not priced, the present-discounted value
of liabilities should be computed using the risk-free nominal yield curve.
The only question of operational interest is how best to construct an empir-
ical proxy for that yield curve—an issue that is addressed below.
With respect to the appropriate discount rate, two claims quite different
from the one put forward here are often asserted. First, it is often argued that
because pension sponsors sometimes default on their pension obligations,
the pension promises they make should be discounted at a rate appropriate
for risky cash ﬂows. After all, plan participants are creditors of the ﬁrm just
as bondholders are, so why should obligations payable to one be treated any
differently from obligations payable to the other? The difference is that the
pension trust serves as security for the pension obligations; with a trust of
sufﬁcient value and appropriate construction, the pension promises of any
sponsor can be rendered free of risk. And to determine whether they are
free of risk, those promises should be discounted at a riskless rate even if
the general obligations of that sponsor are seen as highly risky.
A second claim contrary to the one put forward here is that the choice of
discount rate for future liabilities should be inﬂuenced by the nature of the
assets held by the pension trust. Indeed, according to Lawrence Bader and
Jeremy Gold, the Actuarial Standard of Practice (ASOP) dealing with the
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out the use of a near-riskless rate to discount the well-funded pension liabil-
ities of strong sponsors, where the assets are invested in risky securities.”
40
ASOP 27 reads in part as follows: “Generally, the appropriate discount
rate is the same as the investment return assumption.”
41 This is a remark-
able statement, because it suggests that plan sponsors can reduce their
funding obligations by investing in riskier securities, whereas conventional
ﬁnance theory would suggest that a given level of beneﬁt security can be
maintained despite a shift to a riskier investment portfolio only by increas-
ing, rather than reducing, contributions into the plan.
What Composition of the Asset Portfolio?
If pension promises are known and must be met with certainty, then the
sponsor must hold a core portfolio of sufﬁcient value, invested so as to
immunize the risk of its liabilities. The sponsor could, of course, hold a
portfolio of greater value than the required minimum, in which case the
surplus value would not have to be held in the immunizing asset.
42 But the
sponsor may not hold less than the required minimum amount and may not
invest any of that required minimum in any asset other than the immunizing
asset—in this case, bonds structured to deliver their cash ﬂows as the pen-
sion obligations come due. As Bodie points out,
43 an all-bonds portfolio has
the additional advantage from the sponsor’s perspective of maximizing
the beneﬁt associated with the tax-preferred status of the pension fund.
Other Issues
The triplet of prescriptions identiﬁed here—fund to the ABO, discount
using the risk-free rate, and either purchase deferred annuities or invest the
pension trust in nominal bonds designed to mature as the pension obligations
come due—provides an internally consistent set of answers to the three
questions posed at the beginning of this section. Moreover, if the objective
is to render the pension promise essentially free of risk, and if the market
254 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2006
40. Bader and Gold (2003, p. 11, note 16). The claim here, of course, is even stronger:
that a near-riskless rate should be used to discount even the well-funded pension liabilities
of weak sponsors.
41. Pension Committee of the Actuarial Standards Board (1996, p. 5).
42. Bodie (1990a, p. 16).
43. Bodie (1990a).for labor were perfectly competitive and frictionless, these answers would
be exactly correct. Given the importance of the issue, it is a little surpris-
ing that the literature seems not to have progressed much beyond these
statements. As noted earlier, Bulow addresses the possibility that implicit
contracts govern the life-cycle pattern of compensation, but he sees such
contracts as probably not very relevant and in any event not well indexed by
the size of the DB plan.
44 To my knowledge there has been no examination
of the quality of the approximation provided by the ABO-based triplet in
other market contexts, such as where efﬁciency wages are important.
If the reforms recommended here were to be implemented, the pension
promise would be a risk-free obligation except for demographic risk. In that
case the market value of a ﬁrm’s pension liabilities would appropriately be
measured using the yield curve of risk-free rates, regardless of the credit-
worthiness of the sponsor. That would be a simpler world, because the
same measure of liability would be relevant for pension regulators, partic-
ipants in bankruptcy proceedings, and securities analysts attempting to
estimate the value of individual ﬁrms.
Given that the reforms recommended here have not been implemented,
however, the situation is not so simple, and one can imagine several alter-
native interesting measures of pension liability, each relevant from the
perspective of a different stakeholder. From the perspective of the gov-
ernment, a measure of interest is the present-discounted value of beneﬁts
guaranteed by the PBGC. Assuming that the taxpayer will ultimately step
in, if necessary, rather than allow the PBGC to default on its stated obli-
gations, this measure of liability should be computed using a yield curve of
risk-free rates. From the perspective of ﬁnancial analysts and investors, a
measure of interest is the present-discounted value of the sponsor’s liability.
This measure should be computed using a discount rate that reﬂects not only
the risk-free rate but also the ratio of assets to liabilities in the plan, the
extent to which the assets of the plan have been invested so as to immunize
the liability risk of the plan, and the creditworthiness of the sponsor.
45
From the perspective of the worker, a measure of interest is the market
value of the beneﬁts that workers will receive under the plan. This mea-
sure can fall no lower than the amount guaranteed by the PBGC, but it also
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45. These are the same factors that determine the value of the option held by the ﬁrm to
put the obligations of the plan to the PBGC.includes a call option on the assets of the plan with a strike price equal to
the guaranteed amount. Obviously, once one steps outside the world of
perfect certainty, the range of potentially interesting measures of liability
becomes much greater. However, the range is not unlimited, and a com-
mon feature of the measures described above is that they each attempt to
answer a well-deﬁned economic question. It is not apparent that the same
can be said of each of the measures of pension liability currently in use.
The Anatomy of Plan Failure
Viewed from a sufﬁciently high altitude that the messiness of the details
fades from view, the pension landscape described earlier in this paper has
a generally sensible aspect. Barring a waiver from the IRS, sponsors are
required to contribute enough each year both to fund their normal cost for
that year and to amortize a portion of any unfunded liability that the plan
may have accumulated. Sponsors of plans with especially deep under-
funding face an additional funding requirement intended to accelerate their
progress toward full funding. Taxpayers shoulder a contingent liability
associated with their backstopping of private plans, but they are compen-
sated in a way that is at least loosely tied to risk. All in all, therefore, the
system has clearly been conﬁgured with an eye to limiting the risk borne
by both beneﬁciaries and taxpayers while providing some ﬂexibility to
employers. Yet, as already noted, the PBGC currently reports a net ﬁnan-
cial position of −$23 billion and is likely, in the view of most analysts, to
encounter even greater ﬁnancial difﬁculty in the years ahead. Thus the
question: In practice, what features of the current pension environment have
allowed some plans to get themselves into desperate ﬁnancial condition,
causing some of them ultimately to default on promises to workers, generate
large obligations for the government insurance program, and put surviving
sponsors at risk of having to bear more than their economically fair load?
No recent study has attempted to quantify the contributions of speciﬁc
features of the current system to the deficit status of the PBGC, but in
congressional testimony Steven Kandarian, former director of the PBGC,
pointed to several key factors without attaching numerical estimates.
Among those factors were the following:
46
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46. Kandarian (2003, pp. 4–7).—Pension plan assets have not been structured so as to mimic the char-
acteristics of plan liabilities. As a result, the “unprecedented, concurrent
drops in both equity values and interest rates” experienced by plans in recent
years both eroded the value of assets and inﬂated the value of liabilities.
—The additional funding requirement faced by severely or chronically
underfunded plans stops rising when such plans reach a funding ratio (that
is, the ratio of assets to liabilities) equal to 90 percent rather than 100 per-
cent, leaving plans with less than they would need to make good on all
obligations if the plan were to be terminated immediately.
—The deﬁnition of current liability fails to “recognize the full cost of
providing annuities as measured by group annuity prices in the private mar-
ket.” In other words, on average, the combination of discount rates, retirement
ages, and mortality rates assumed by ﬁrms results in too low an estimate of
plan obligations, and hence of the appropriate level of plan funding.
—The deﬁnition of current liability also fails to recognize the increased
tendency, as a plan veers toward termination, of workers to draw subsidized
early-retirement beneﬁts and lump-sum payments.
—Credit balances allow some sponsors to make smaller contributions,
or no contributions at all, even as their plans head toward termination.
—The limit on the maximum deductible contribution inhibits sponsors
from “build[ing] up an adequate surplus in good economic times to provide
a cushion for bad times.”
From time to time the GAO has taken a more quantitative approach to
assessing the causes of large claims on the pension insurance fund.
Although the most comprehensive of these studies is now nearly two
decades old,
47 it may still shed useful light on the current situation. In
that study the GAO estimated that about 70 percent of new claims on the
PBGC between 1983 and 1985 reflected funding rules that were too lax,
partly because they allowed benefit improvements to be amortized over
thirty years. The GAO attributed the remainder of the claims to the fact
that required contributions were not always paid before a plan termi-
nated. Of the amount the GAO classified as required but unpaid, nearly
half reflected required contributions that had not yet come due (because
payments are not due until 8
1⁄2 months after the close of the relevant plan
year), about a third stemmed from arrears, and the remainder reﬂected
amounts that had been waived by the IRS.
David W. Wilcox 257
47. GAO (1987).In two more-recent studies,48 the GAO concentrated on a few termina-
tions that generated large claims on the PBGC; these studies corroborated
a number of the points made by Kandarian. Several of the illustrations
given by the GAO pertained to the termination of plans sponsored by
Bethlehem Steel. With respect to the role of equity investments, the GAO
noted that as of September 30, 2000, Bethlehem had 73 percent of the
assets in its DB plan invested in equities. Over the following year the
value of plan assets declined 25 percent, and by the time the plan terminated
a little more than a year after that, the value of plan assets had declined
another 23 percent.
49 Credit balances also played an important role in the
Bethlehem narrative. The GAO reports that, one year before termination,
Bethlehem faced a minimum required contribution of $270 million.
50 Yet in
the three years preceding the termination of its plans, Bethlehem was able
to avoid contributing any new resources by drawing on its credit balance.
51
The Bethlehem experience also sheds some light on why termination lia-
bility often exceeds current liability. For the purpose of calculating current
liability, Bethlehem participants eligible for unreduced beneﬁts after thirty
years of service were assumed to retire at age sixty-two; for the purpose
of calculating termination liability, however, they were assumed to retire at
age ﬁfty-ﬁve. The GAO cited the PBGC as estimating that the difference
in assumed retirement ages approximately doubled the liability of the plan
for beneﬁts payable to those participants.
52
Separately, the GAO highlighted the extent to which ﬁrms have been
exempted from paying the variable-rate premium. The GAO focused on
three plans that terminated in 2002 and 2003; none of these plans paid a
variable-rate premium in 2001, because they qualiﬁed for the exemption
available to any sponsor whose contribution into the plan in the previous
year was at the so-called “full funding limit,” explained in more detail in
the following section.
53 Finally, the GAO noted a possible role of the limit
on deductible contributions in holding down the contributions of Polaroid
to its plan: As of January 1, 2000, Polaroid’s DB plan had a funding ratio
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48. GAO (2003b, 2003c).
49. GAO (2003b, p. 7).
50. GAO (2003b, p. 12).
51. PBGC (2005g).
52. GAO (2003c, p. 21).
53. GAO (2003c, p. 22).of more than 100 percent, and “The plan’s actuarial report for that year
indicates that the plan sponsor was precluded . . . from making a tax-
deductible contribution to the plan.”
54 A little more than two years later,
the plan was terminated with a funding ratio of 67 percent based on termi-
nation liability.
In yet another study, the GAO highlighted the importance of claims from
ﬂat-beneﬁt plans: “Most of the claims against PBGC’s single-employer
program have come from ‘ﬂat-beneﬁt’ plans that cover hourly workers in
unionized companies.”
55 The GAO did not quantify “most,” nor did it rule
out that the other factors discussed above had also played a role in gener-
ating large claims. Elsewhere the GAO describes various forms of moral
hazard as having increased claims against the PBGC; these include increas-
ing promised beneﬁts, forgoing contributions either legally by waiver or
illegally, and selling “a subsidiary with an underfunded plan to a ﬁnancially
troubled buyer.”
56 No quantitative estimates of the importance of these
effects were provided.
The Nuts and Bolts of Pension System Reform
All in all, the roster of weaknesses in the current DB pension system
looks rather deep. The system is in need of reform in all its major dimen-
sions: funding requirements, portfolio investment restrictions, insurance
premiums, and disclosure. Unless substantial reforms are undertaken, each
of the three major constituencies involved in the system will continue to
bear needless costs: Workers will confront needless uncertainty regarding
their future ﬁnancial security; healthy sponsors will continue to face the risk
of having to subsidize unhealthy ones; all sponsors will operate in a regu-
latory regime imposing unnecessary costs; and taxpayers will continue to
subsidize the pension deal between workers and ﬁrms in a manner that is
not widely understood and to a degree that is difﬁcult to estimate.
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54. GAO (2003c, p. 22). As the GAO notes, Polaroid assumed the highest allowable
interest rate in computing its liability for purposes of determining its funding requirement.
Had Polaroid used a lower interest rate, and hence generated a larger estimate of its liability,
the corporation might have been able to make a deductible contribution.
55. GAO (1998, p. 9).
56. GAO (1998, p. 17).Specifically with reference to the PBGC, the problem has two dimen-
sions, one backward-looking and one forward-looking. The backward-
looking problem is that the insurance fund has already sustained substantial
net losses from its operations thus far. This problem is much bigger than the
negative net ﬁnancial position already reported by the PBGC, in that spon-
sors have in effect accumulated put options that have considerable value
under current law. To deal with this overhang, three alternative approaches
are logically possible, none of which is attractive: taxpayers could foot the
bill; surviving sponsors could be made to pay premiums that exceed the
economically fair level; or the PBGC could default on its obligations. Of
these three, the first has the virtue of making good on the government’s
promises as they are commonly understood while still allowing PBGC
insurance to be fairly priced on a prospective basis; thus it would avoid
distorting employers’ decisions as to whether to sponsor or continue spon-
soring DB plans. In the words of the CBO, “Conceptually and practically,
the prospective approach [calibrating premiums to future risks rather than
accrued losses] has several advantages. The idea of a fair insurance premium
is intrinsically forward-looking: it is the expected cost of future adverse
outcomes covered under the terms of the insurance policy.”
57 In a com-
petitive market for plan termination insurance, any provider attempting to
raise premiums above their economic level would be undercut by other
providers willing to price at marginal cost on a prospective basis. Moreover,
regardless of the market structure on the provider side, boosting premiums
above their economic level would impose an excess burden on surviving
sponsors, heightening the risk of an exodus from the DB system.
The PBGC’s forward-looking problem is that it will, in all probability,
continue to accrue net economic losses so long as it continues to operate
under current parameters. To remedy this situation and to ensure that the
conditions implied by the three axioms laid out in the introduction are met,
actions would have to be taken in three broad areas: funding and portfolio
investment rules would have to be tightened; the pricing of the PBGC’s
insurance would have to be rationalized; and the information provided
about DB plans—in ﬁrms’ public ﬁnancial statements, in the federal bud-
get, and to workers—would have to be improved. In principle, a thorough
implementation of the recommended steps in any one of these three areas
might be sufﬁcient to right the ship without any reform in the other two
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57. CBO (2005b, p. 8).areas. For example, an ideal system of risk-sensitive premiums might lead
sponsors to fully fund their plans and immunize their liability risk. Alter-
natively, a perfect system of public disclosure might so enhance market
discipline as to induce sponsors to aim for full funding and complete
immunization. Despite these possibilities, the approach taken here is to
recommend fundamental changes in all three areas. This approach delib-
erately involves a degree of redundancy—belt, suspenders, and bungee
cords—on the theory that not all reforms may be implemented simultane-
ously and that, even if all were implemented and functioned as intended,
the cost of redundancy would be small and might be zero.
58 For example,
a sponsor with a fully funded and immunized plan would not have to pay
any insurance premium except, perhaps, for a base amount to cover PBGC
administrative expenses.
The First Locus of Reform: Funding Requirements, Limitations 
on Beneﬁt Increases, and Portfolio Investment Restrictions
DETERMINATION OF REQUIRED CONTRIBUTIONS: CURRENT LAW. Required
contributions today depend on four main factors: normal cost, supplemen-
tal liabilities that are amortized over several years rather than funded in
full immediately, an additional funding requirement faced by sponsors of
severely or chronically underfunded plans, and various exemptions from
and disincentives for additional funding.
A plan’s normal cost in a given year is the amount of beneﬁts attributed
under its funding method to that year. Many different methods for com-
puting normal cost have been developed, each of which allocates costs
differently over time. Treasury regulations disallow methods that allocate
these costs in a manner that is deemed to be too back-loaded. In the sim-
plest of all possible worlds, setting contributions equal to normal cost each
year would cause assets to keep pace with liabilities and thus cause the
plan to remain fully funded.
Every forecaster knows, however, that history never unfolds exactly as
projected: Rates of return, mortality, and salary growth differ from their
assumed values; actuarial assumptions are adjusted; plan provisions are
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58. Bodie and Merton (1993) and Bodie (1996) emphasize the complementarity of the
tools discussed here. They also emphasize the importance of improving the PBGC’s ability to
monitor plan sponsors and the inadequacy of the PBGC’s current tools in this regard—topics
not addressed here.changed; and sponsors grant beneﬁts based on service before plan inception.
All of these eventualities create gaps between assets and liability. Such gaps
are amortized over various periods depending on the source of the discrep-
ancy, as shown in the table below:
59
Source of unfunded liability Amortization period
Experience gains and losses (deviations of  5 years
rates of return, mortality, and other 
factors, from assumptions)
Changes in actuarial assumptions 10 years
Plan amendments 30 years
Initial unfunded liability, for plans  30 years
established after January 1, 1974
The idea of these amortization charges and credits is to continuously—
albeit slowly—nudge assets back into line with liability.
Single-employer plans with more than 100 participants may face an addi-
tional funding requirement (AFR) if they are either severely or chronically
underfunded.
60 Whether a plan is subject to an AFR is determined by the
plan’s funding ratio. If either the funding ratio is less than 80 percent, or
the funding ratio is between 80 and 90 percent and has not been above 
90 percent in two consecutive years within the past three, the plan is subject
to the AFR. Sweeping aside many details, the AFR is determined roughly
as follows:
where the amortization fraction is 18 percent for plans with a funding
ratio of 90 percent, 30 percent for plans with a funding ratio of 60 percent
or lower, and linearly interpolated for plans in between. Thus the AFR is
AFR unfunded liability amortization fraction, =×
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59. McGill and others (2005, p. 686).
60. The additional funding requirement was introduced in the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1987 (see GAO, 1994, p. 2) and amended in the Retirement Protection Act
of 1994, enacted as part of P.L. 103-465. Current statutory requirements are specified in
26 U.S.C. §412(l). See McGill and others (2005, pp. 689ff.) for a helpful description of the
requirements. Regarding the actuarial value of assets, see 26 U.S.C. §412(c)(2)(A). Treasury
Department regulations (26 C.F.R. §1412(c)(2)-1) ﬁll in the details and specify that the
actuarial value may not stray too far from the fair market value or run consistently above or
below both the current fair market value and a moving average of same.intended to cause plan sponsors with severely or chronically underfunded
plans to contribute enough each year, in total, both to fund their normal
cost in the given year and to accelerate their progress in closing any gap
between assets and liabilities. Note, however, that the accelerated gap
closure intended under the AFR applies neither to any plan with a funding
ratio in excess of 90 percent nor to many plans with funding ratios between
80 and 90 percent. In a study of the 100 largest plans between 1995 and
2002, the GAO found that only about three plans per year, on average, were
assessed an AFR, despite the fact that about ten plans per year had fund-
ing ratios of less than 90 percent.
61
Two other provisions allow ﬁrms to contribute less than the amounts
indicated above, two more limit their incentive to contribute in excess of the
minimum required amount, and a ﬁnal provision allows funding require-
ments to be waived altogether under some circumstances:
—Credit balances. The difference between actual and minimum required
contributions is cumulated—together with imputed interest earnings—in
a hypothetical account called the funding standard account (FSA).
62 Firms
that have, on net, contributed more than the required minimum have a
credit balance in their FSA, which they can use to offset current or future
required contributions. Credit balances have enabled some distressed
sponsors (such as Bethlehem Steel, as discussed above) to defer required
contributions during the run-up to bankruptcy, arguably causing the PBGC
to absorb a greater loss.
—Full funding limit. ERISA sets a cap—known as the full funding limit,
or FFL—on the amount that sponsors may be required to contribute in
any given year. When it binds, the FFL causes the required contribution to
fall short of the amount indicated by the plan’s normal cost, amortization
charges, and AFR. The following is a stylized version of how the FFL has
been determined since 2004:
where AL is accrued liability (which may be computed taking projected
future salary increases into account), MVA is the market value of assets,
FFL AL MVA,AVA CL AVA , =− ( ) × ( ) − [] max min , . 09
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61. GAO (2005, p. 25).
62. McGill and others (2005, p. 687) and 29 U.S.C. §1082(b)(2).AVA is the actuarial value of assets, and CL is current liability.63 Roughly,
the idea of the FFL is to shield sponsors from having to contribute more to
their plans than would cause their plans to be fully funded as deﬁned in the
law. Given that the spirit of the other funding rules is to ensure that sponsors
fund their normal costs and close a fraction of any existing funding gap, it
might seem counterintuitive that a ﬁrm could, in the absence of the FFL,
have been required to make a contribution that would have taken assets
above liability, but such an outcome is possible given the variety of deﬁni-
tions of assets and liability involved in the various determinations.
—Maximum deductible amount. Pension contributions may be deducted
from income for tax purposes, up to a limit specified in law.
64 As was
noted earlier, the determination of the maximum deductible amount is so
complex as to be more easily illustrated than described (see ﬁgure 1 above).
Amounts contributed in excess of the maximum deductible amount are
subject to a 10 percent excise tax.
—Limitations on reversions of plan assets. Generally speaking, surplus
pension assets may not be withdrawn from the trust unless the plan has
been terminated and all the liabilities of the plan have been met. In the
event of termination, surplus assets may revert to the sponsor but must be
included in the sponsor’s taxable income (thereby unwinding the original tax
deduction) and are subject to an excise tax of between 20 and 50 percent.
65
This excise tax creates a strong incentive for ﬁnancially distressed sponsors
to ensure that their plans are not materially overfunded and thus have no
buffer against unforeseen developments.
—Waivers. If a plan sponsor would be unable to meet the minimum
funding standard “without temporary substantial business hardship . . . and
if application of the standard would be adverse to the interests of plan
participants. . . ,” the IRS may waive some or all of the required contribu-
tion except for the amount required to amortize any previous waivers.
66
Waived contributions must be amortized over ﬁve years, beginning in the
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63. See U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Taxation (2005, pp. 30–31). Between 1995 and
2003 the cap on required contributions was set as follows: FFL = max[min(AL, αCL) −
min(MVA, AVA), (0.9 × CL) − AVA], where α was 165 percent in 2002 and 170 percent
in 2003.
64. See U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Taxation (2005, p. 34).
65. U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Taxation (2005, pp. 19–20).
66. Requirements with respect to waivers and criteria for the determination of “business
hardship” are spelled out in 26 U.S.C. §412(d).year following the waiver, and no more than three waivers may be obtained
in any ﬁfteen-year period.
67
DETERMINATION OF REQUIRED CONTRIBUTIONS: PROPOSED REFORMS.
To minimize the risk presented to workers, taxpayers, and healthy sponsors,
in line with the axioms stated in the introduction, sponsors should be
required to fund beneﬁt accruals each year plus amortize any shortfalls or
surpluses over a reasonably short period, all on a mark-to-market basis.
68
Implementation of this objective would require the following changes
relative to current law:
—The method of calculating plan liability for purposes of determining
required contributions should be greatly streamlined. The simple theory
sketched earlier suggests that a single measure of liability, deﬁned on an
ABO-type basis and calculated using discount rates taken from an empir-
ical proxy for the risk-free yield curve, should be sufﬁcient.
—All gaps between assets and liability should be amortized over some
uniform and reasonably short period—perhaps on the order of ﬁve or seven
years—regardless of the sources of those gaps.
69
—The AFR should be eliminated, taking with it the associated funding
volatility and administrative complexity.
—Increases in ﬂat-dollar beneﬁts should either be treated as part of
normal cost, in line with the treatment of increases in salary-linked beneﬁts,
or be amortized over the same reasonably short period applicable to all
other sources of underfunding.
—Shutdown beneﬁts and improvements in plan beneﬁts should likewise
be amortized over the uniform period.
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67. VanDerhei (1990) is the only study of which I am aware that attempts to quantify
the importance of waivers in boosting the ultimate demands on PBGC resources. Using
data from Form 5500 ﬁlings, he identiﬁed 115 waivers granted in 1980 and 1981; the
waived amounts totaled $622 million. By 1987, 20 percent of the sponsors that had been
granted waivers in 1980 and 1981 had terminated their plans. Claims from these sponsors
totaled $136 million, but VanDerhei attributed only $26 million of that amount to the waivers
that had been granted in 1980 and 1981. Thus he computed a loss ratio of only 4.2 percent
for the waivers from this period.
68. Gold (2005, p. 93) sketches a similar reform objective: “. . . any long-term solution
must require full funding of accrued liabilities (measured at riskless rates) at all times.”
69. If assets were invested so as to immunize liability risk, as recommended below, a
key source of discrepancy between assets and liability would be removed. Remaining sources
would include experience gains and losses (outcomes that differ from actuarial assumptions)
and amendments to plan provisions.—Whatever length of time is chosen as the period over which funding
shortfalls will be amortized should also become the length of time over
which the PBGC guarantee becomes effective. Thus, for example, if shut-
down beneﬁts are amortized over ﬁve years, the guarantee of those bene-
ﬁts should be phased in over ﬁve years, measured not from the time when
the shutdown provision was added to the plan, as under current law, but
from the time when the shutdown was recognized by the actuary for the
plan.
70 The same general approach should apply for other improvements
in beneﬁts.
—Currently, a sponsor that offers subsidized early-retirement beneﬁts
or subsidized lump sums may be vulnerable to a “run on the bank” if par-
ticipants come to suspect the ﬁnancial viability of the plan. To eliminate
that vulnerability, the subsidized portion of early-retirement beneﬁts and
lump sums should be paid out of funds other than those held in the pension
trust, and the subsidy portion should not be insured by the PBGC.
—A plan should be frozen automatically when the sponsor is delinquent
in making a contribution and should remain frozen until the sponsor has
eliminated any arrears.
—Assets should be valued at current market prices, and ﬁrms should
no longer be able to use credit balances in the FSA to reduce their required
contributions.
—The FFL on required contributions should be eliminated.
Sponsors often highlight the limit on tax deductibility and the excise
tax on pension fund reversions as factors inhibiting them from funding up
their plans in ﬂush ﬁnancial times. Some relaxation of these constraints
may be in order, but two considerations suggest that any steps in this
direction should be modest: First, the motivation for the constraint on tax
deductibility is to limit the loss of tax revenue that sponsors are able to
engineer by shifting the timing of their pension contributions; that moti-
vation remains legitimate. Second, the reforms outlined here would move
sponsors a long way toward contributing their normal cost year in and
year out. By eliminating the bulk of the volatility in funding requirements,
these reforms arguably would also eliminate most of the need to manage
the timing of contributions and most of the need for a cushion of assets in
excess of the required minimum.
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70. GAO (2003b) makes a suggestion along these lines.An important issue related to the design of funding requirements is
how best to construct an empirical proxy for a yield curve appropriate for
risk-free cash ﬂows. One possibility would be to use quotes from the market
for Treasury securities. A Treasury yield curve would have two disadvan-
tages in this context: ﬁrst, that the underlying securities are tax-advantaged
and thus less preferred by pension funds given their tax-exempt status;
and second, that prices in the Treasury market incorporate a premium for
liquidity—another characteristic that may be of relatively little importance
to pension funds given their typical investment horizons. A second possible
approach is the one currently used by the PBGC, which calculates a pair
of discount rates based on a survey of annuity prices. This approach has
the appeal of being tied very directly to the existing private market for this
type of obligation, but the disadvantages of involving a relatively opaque
process and of dealing only crudely with the time structure of the liabilities.
A third possibility that warrants serious investigation would be to use the
yield curve implicit in the market for swaps between floating-rate and
ﬁxed-rate debt. These rates have the disadvantage of including a small
premium for credit risk, but that premium seems unlikely to be more than
50 basis points, and thus hardly disqualifying. Moreover, swaps based on
the London interbank offer rate (LIBOR) have the advantage of trading in
an active and highly transparent market.
RESTRICTIONS ON THE ABILITY OF SPONSORS WITH UNFUNDED LIABILITIES
TO INCREASE BENEFITS: CURRENT LAW. If a proposed plan amendment
would increase the current liability of the plan and leave the funding ratio
of the plan below 60 percent, the sponsor must provide security in an
amount speciﬁed by law.
71 Similarly, a plan sponsor in bankruptcy may
not amend a plan in a way that would increase plan liabilities “by reason
of any increase in beneﬁts, any change in the accrual of beneﬁts, or any
change in the rate at which beneﬁts vest under the plan.”
72 Plan amendments
that would leave the funding ratio above 60 percent are not constrained so
long as the sponsor is not in bankruptcy proceedings.
RESTRICTIONS ON THE ABILITY OF SPONSORS WITH UNFUNDED LIABILITIES
TO INCREASE BENEFITS: PROPOSED REFORMS. Aligning the uniform amor-
tization period with the period over which the PBGC guarantee is phased
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71. See 26 U.S.C. §401(a)(29) and U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Taxation (2005,
pp. 32–33).
72. U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Taxation (2005, p. 33).in should provide full protection to the insurance program from the risk
associated with beneﬁt increases; it should also provide substantial protec-
tion to workers. The restrictions on beneﬁt increases embodied in current
law could be retained, although they should become substantially irrelevant
if and as the incidence of deep underfunding is eliminated.
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS: CURRENT LAW. The ﬁduciary
of a DB plan is required to “[diversify] the investments of the plan so as
to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is
clearly prudent not to do so.”
73 Fiduciaries are not required under current
law to immunize the risk in the liabilities of the plan; evidently, in fact,
almost no consideration is given in statute or regulation to requiring that
the ﬁduciary take any account of the characteristics of plan liabilities in
designing the portfolio of assets.
74 Coronado and Liang report that, in 2003,
“about two-thirds of the ﬁrms [in their sample] allocated between 60 and
75 percent of their DB assets to equity securities. Similarly, two-thirds of the
ﬁrms allocated between 20 and 35 percent of the portfolio to ﬁxed income
securities.”
75 In the aggregate, as ﬁgure 3 shows, pension plans in 2003 held
about 60 percent of their assets in equities. According to the investment
management ﬁrm PIMCO, “the 100 largest U.S. deﬁned beneﬁt pension
plans [as of 2002 were] unhedged on more than 90 percent of their interest
rate exposure.”
76 Anecdotally, I am aware of only two ﬁrms having used
their assets to immunize liability risk: Boots, a British pharmaceutical
retailer, which is said to have backed off this policy, and United Airlines,
which is reported to have abandoned the strategy in the mid-1980s.
77
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS: PROPOSED REFORMS. If ﬁrms
are to immunize their liability risk to the maximum practical degree, they
should hold very high quality debt instruments structured to deliver their
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73. 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1). McGill and others (2005, p. 742) note that, notwithstanding
the diversification requirement, the fiduciary of the plan may invest all of its assets in
“insurance or annuity contracts guaranteed by a life insurance company or wholly in the
securities of the federal government or its agencies.”
74. The only exception of which I am aware is that sponsors are required to take account
of the liquidity needs of the plan—in other words, to ensure that any assets held are sufﬁciently
liquid as to be available to pay beneﬁts as they come due.
75. Coronado and Liang (2005, p. 9).
76. Ruthen (2005).
77. Mary Williams Walsh, “How Wall Street Wrecked United’s Pension,” The New
York Times, July 31, 2005, p. 3.1.cash flows as the benefit obligations come due. In practice, such debt
instruments should probably consist mainly of very high quality private
securities. If the demand for such instruments were to expand dramatically,
one could expect borrowing ﬁrms to cater to that demand by adjusting their
capital structures, and financial markets to repackage existing debt by
slicing it into senior tranches suitable for pension fund investors and junior
tranches for other investors better positioned to shoulder credit risk.
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT PRACTICES OF THE PBGC AT PRESENT. The
assets of the PBGC are maintained in two separate funds: An on-budget
revolving fund receives premium income and is the source of beneﬁt pay-
ments, and an off-budget trust fund receives assets taken over from termi-
nated plans and recoveries from employers. Transfers are made from the
trust fund to compensate the revolving fund for beneﬁt payments deemed
to have been backed by assets taken over from the sponsor. The PBGC
invests the revolving fund entirely in Treasury securities, but it invests a
portion of the trust fund in equities, including actively managed equities.
As of September 30, 2005, the revolving fund amounted to $16.4 billion
while the trust fund held $32.6 billion. The share of the portfolio invested
in equities has ﬂuctuated over the years. At the end of ﬁscal 2005 that share
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Figure 3. Allocation of Aggregate Deﬁned-Beneﬁt Pension Assets in 2003was about 25 percent, down from about 30 percent one year earlier; cash
and ﬁxed-income securities made up virtually all of the rest. The reduction
in the equity share reﬂected a deliberate decision on the part of the PBGC
to increase its use of ﬁxed-income securities to immunize its liabilities.
Under that policy the PBGC will eventually reduce its equity holdings to
between 15 and 25 percent of its portfolio.
78
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT PRACTICES OF THE PBGC: PROPOSED REFORMS.
The liabilities of the PBGC derive from plans already terminated and thus
are not adjusted for further increases in service or salary; effectively, they
are known in nominal terms, up to mortality risk. Presumably, the PBGC
should conduct itself as if it will be required to meet its obligations with
certainty. Under that assumption the cost-minimizing (and therefore value-
maximizing) method of operation is for the PBGC to invest its assets
entirely in long-dated zero-coupon bonds structured to mature as the obliga-
tions of the terminated plans come due.
79 Bodie provides a particularly
simple and elegant demonstration of the proposition that the immunizing
portfolio meets the obligation with certainty at minimum cost.
80
WOULD THE PROPOSED REFORMS REDUCE THE VOLATILITY OF REQUIRED
CONTRIBUTIONS? Plan sponsors express great concern about the volatility
of required contributions under current law. Several of the reforms pro-
posed here would eliminate mechanisms that sponsors have viewed as
useful in reducing that volatility. (The relaxation of the constraints on tax
deductibility is the exception, as it would be viewed as allowing firms
greater ﬂexibility to fund up their plans when times are good.) But the
volatility of contributions is entirely a choice of plan sponsors. Bader and
Gold point to the obvious ﬁrst step for sponsors seeking to reduce funding
volatility: “Asset-liability matching can sharply curtail the volatility of
financing gains and losses, and the purchase of deferred annuities can
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78. See PBGC (2005f, p. 14).
79. Because it receives a continual ﬂow of assets from terminated plans, and because the
liquidation of those assets takes at least a little time, the PBGC will not be able to boost the
measured share of ﬁxed-income securities in its portfolio to 100 percent so long as sponsors
are permitted to hold substantial fractions of their portfolios in equities. If sponsors immu-
nized their liability risk, an all-bond portfolio would be cost-minimizing for the PBGC,
notwithstanding the fact that additional plans would be terminated in the future. If sponsors
continue to carry unhedged equity risk, conventional ﬁnance theory would suggest that the
PBGC should hold a short position in equities.
80. Bodie (2005).eliminate it.”81 If even the remaining volatility—which would derive from
the inﬂuence of interest rate changes on normal cost—proved intolerable
to sponsors, they could render their funding requirements essentially
entirely predictable from year to year by redeﬁning the promised beneﬁt
under the plan. For example, they could structure their plans so that a ﬁxed
percentage of salary would be contributed each year and used to purchase
deferred ﬁxed (though possibly inﬂation-indexed) annuities in whatever
amount the market would provide under current conditions.
82 Equivalently,
the plan could self-insure by building a duration-matched portfolio of bonds.
Either way, the sponsor could achieve complete control over pension costs
(through its control over the salary deferral rate) and completely eliminate
funding volatility. At the same time, some of the critical features of the
DB model would have been preserved: Workers would be given access to
the annuity market at group rates; the security of the retirement promise
would have been enhanced; and a considerable degree of predictability about
the amount of retirement income to be provided through this means would
have been retained.
The Second Locus of Reform: Pricing of PBGC Insurance
DETERMINATION OF INSURANCE PREMIUMS:  CURRENT LAW. As was
outlined earlier, the PBGC receives premium income in return for the insur-
ance it provides. Under ERISA as originally enacted, the only form of
premium was a ﬂat-rate fee of $1 per year per participant.
83 The ﬂat-rate
premium was increased in several steps during the 1980s before reaching
$19 per year per participant in 1991. The ﬂat-rate premium remained at its
1991 level in nominal terms (and thus obviously declined substantially in
real terms) until it was raised to $30 in the budget bill enacted in early
2006. A variable-rate premium was added in 1987, assessed initially at
$6 per $1,000 of unfunded vested liability and capped at $34 per participant
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81. Bader and Gold (2003, p. 12).
82. The general design sketched here would appear to preserve the DB character of the
plan, but, depending on the speciﬁcs, variations on this structure might raise issues as to
whether they would be subject to the deﬁned-beneﬁt or the deﬁned-contribution regulatory
regime.
83. Here, as elsewhere in the paper, the description pertains to single-employer plans
only. Participants include active employees, employees who have separated from the ﬁrm
after being vested in the plan but who have not yet begun drawing benefits, and current
beneﬁciaries.per year. The premium rate was increased to $9 per $1,000 in 1991, and
the cap was removed in 1996.
84 Firms that contributed the FFL amount in
the immediately preceding year are exempt from the variable-rate portion
of the premium in the current year.
85
Many analysts have criticized the current structure of premiums as fail-
ing to apply economically appropriate prices to the risk that plans actually
present to the PBGC.
86 To be sure, premiums are not completely insensitive
to risk under current law; the variable-rate portion of the premium does
penalize some underfunding. Even so, the current structure of premiums
bears little resemblance to the economically fair structure for two reasons:
First, and most obviously, only one risk factor—the level of plan assets
relative to plan liabilities—is taken into account in determining the pre-
mium, yet the risk confronted by the PBGC also depends on the ﬁnancial
health of plan sponsors and the extent to which plan assets have been
invested so as to immunize liability risk.
87 The second major ﬂaw in the
current premium structure is that even the one risk factor recognized is
priced only very incompletely. Precise ﬁgures are difﬁcult to come by, but
one set of calculations suggests that, in 2003, the variable-rate premium was
assessed against only about a ﬁfth of current-liability-basis underfunding;
the rest was exempted under the FFL-related provision noted above.
88
Several analysts have argued that, in addition to being too insensitive
to risk, the current structure of premiums is simply too low, generating too
little revenue given the current scale and structure of risks presented to the
PBGC. Steven Boyce and Richard Ippolito simulate a detailed model of the
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84. GAO (2003a, p. 9).
85. See, for example, GAO (2005, p. 9, note 24). At ﬁrst blush it might not be apparent
how a ﬁrm that has met the standard of the FFL might otherwise be subject to the variable-
rate premium (which applies, by deﬁnition, only to ﬁrms with unfunded liability). Such a
circumstance can arise because a plan’s status with respect to the variable-rate premium is
determined using different measures of liability than that used to determine the FFL.
86. Among many others, see VanDerhei (1990), Lewis and Pennacchi (1999), Boyce
and Ippolito (2002), and CBO (2005b).
87. See, among others, Lewis and Pennacchi (1999) and Pennacchi and Lewis (1994).
88. Center on Federal Financial Institutions (2005b) stresses the importance of exemp-
tions from the variable-rate premium and states that an even larger fraction—90 percent—
of liability was exempted in 2003. Precise figures are difficult to come by, because the
variable-rate premium is calculated using its own deﬁnition of liability. The estimate quoted
in the text is based on the version of current liability used to determine minimum required
contributions. This version uses a weighted moving-average interest rate to discount liabilities,
whereas the version of current liabilities that is used to compute the variable-rate premium
is based on a spot rate.DB sector and conclude that a private provider of current-law insurance
would demand about twice as much premium income as the current pre-
mium structure generates.
89 VanDerhei concludes that the pricing prevail-
ing as of his writing was even more inadequate: He estimates that levying
an actuarially (but not economically) fair risk premium against actual
exposure in 1984 would have boosted variable-rate premium income to
the PBGC by a factor of about 4
1⁄2.90 Finally, Christopher Lewis and
George Pennacchi, as well as the CBO, estimate that both ﬁxed-rate and
variable-rate premiums should be boosted by a factor of about six in order
to reﬂect the full economic cost of current-law coverage.
91
Although premium revenue clearly seems too low given the current
structure of risks presented to the PBGC, it bears emphasizing that premium
revenue would not necessarily be substantially greater, and could be sub-
stantially less, in a reformed system. Boyce and Ippolito note that if sponsors
were bound to a more stringent set of funding rules, and therefore presented
less risk exposure to the PBGC, a fully priced set of economic premiums
could, in fact, generate much less revenue than is provided in expectation
under current law.
92 The same would be true to an even greater degree
with both tighter funding rules and more stringent portfolio investment
requirements.
DETERMINATION OF INSURANCE PREMIUMS: PROPOSED REFORMS. The
premiums assessed by the PBGC should both allow the insurance program
to cover its administrative costs and provide full compensation for all risk
presented to it. Plans with sufﬁcient assets, structured to immunize the risk
of plan liabilities, present essentially no risk to the PBGC and so should pay
no premium beyond the amount required to cover its administrative costs;
these can be recovered by means of a successor to the current ﬂat-rate pre-
mium. With 44 million insured participants, the PBGC could have covered
its administrative expenses of $263 million in 2004 with a ﬂat-rate annual
premium of about $6 per participant.
93 As many observers have noted, a
premium based on number of participants subsidizes plans with older work-
forces and more-generous beneﬁt provisions at the expense of new plans and
plans with younger workforces. To address that concern, a base premium
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89. Boyce and Ippolito (2002).
90. VanDerhei (1990).
91. Lewis and Pennacchi (1999); CBO (2005b).
92. Boyce and Ippolito (2002, p. 158).
93. The ﬁgure for administrative expenses is from PBGC (2005c).could alternatively be tied to insured liability. For example, given the
$1.55 trillion in PBGC-insured liability in 2002 (the latest year for which
data are available), expenses that year of $222 million could have been
recovered with a charge of about 14 cents per $1,000 of insured liability.
Before the design of a risk-based premium can be taken up, two ques-
tions of general principle must be addressed: First, should the government
merely aim to assess actuarially fair premiums—and therefore only recover
expected costs as they would be calculated using the Treasury rate—or
should it be required to levy an additional charge to compensate for the
fact that its losses occur disproportionately when ﬁnancial resources are
especially valuable? Private insurers acting in the place of the PBGC
would demand compensation for such systematic risk, and basic principles
of ﬁnancial economics suggest that the PBGC should do the same.
94 The
reason is not that the government should behave as if it were risk averse
itself, but rather that a government seeking to tally the full cost of its pro-
grams should recognize that other participants in the economy are risk
averse. An implication of that risk aversion on the part of others is that
the government should take account not only of the average amount of
resources it is appropriating from the private sector but also of the circum-
stances under which it is doing so. Programs that cause resources to be
appropriated disproportionately when times are bad—and hence when
resources are especially valuable—should be scored as more costly than
programs that appropriate the same amount of resources in expectation but
without correlation to the business cycle, and more costly by an even wider
margin than programs that appropriate resources disproportionately when
times are good.
A logical and appropriate consequence of a charge for market risk is
that the PBGC would be expected to run a small surplus on average, once
its insurance is fully priced. Pennacchi addresses the same issue in the
context of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: “An outcome of
setting fair rates is that the FDIC will make profits, on average. That is,
premiums less insurance losses must be, on average, positive in order to
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94. The assertion here that the PBGC insurance premium should include compensation
for risk does not contradict the equivalence, noted in the section on theory above, between
Treasury rates and annuity rates in a frictionless, perfectly competitive world in which
sponsors are required to fully fund their plans and immunize their risk. If all liability risk has
been immunized, as was assumed above, insurance premiums would not reﬂect a premium
for market risk.compensate taxpayers for having to fund large net insurance losses during
economic downturns.”
95 As Pennacchi notes, the presence of a surplus might
incorrectly strike some observers “as evidence of excessive, rather than fair,
insurance premiums.” As noted by the CBO,
96 the “problem” of the surplus
could be addressed by having the PBGC pay the general fund of the federal
government a reinsurance premium, set at the estimated amount that the
PBGC has collected from plan sponsors as compensation for risk. Alter-
natively, if the PBGC comes to be viewed as backed by the full faith and
credit of the Treasury, a simpler method for dealing with the expected proﬁt
would be to abolish the trust fund and the revolving fund, eliminating the
distraction of the balance in those two funds and putting the focus where
it should be, namely, on the question of whether premium rates have been
set appropriately on a prospective basis.
97
A second matter of general principle is the question of whether—and to
what extent—premiums should be adjusted to the individual characteristics
of plan sponsors or reﬂect only aggregate conditions. Boyce and Ippolito
argue that premium rates should reﬂect only the average probability of
bankruptcy across the population of insured entities.
98 They argue that tuning
premium rates to the ﬁnancial health of individual sponsors would effec-
tively tie premiums to precisely the risk being insured against. Just as an
insurance company is not allowed to boost the premium under a term life
insurance contract if and when the health of the policyholder has deterio-
rated, so the PBGC should not be allowed to boost the premium for pension
insurance when the creditworthiness of the sponsor has declined. Taken
to its logical conclusion, premiums tied to the health of the sponsor could
substantially reduce or eliminate the value of the insurance. The Boyce-
Ippolito argument is sensible with respect to the risk factor to which they
apply it, namely, bankruptcy risk. However, as was noted earlier, two other
factors—the degree of underfunding and the allocation of plan assets—
are important as well in determining the overall risk that an individual
plan presents to the insurer, and, unlike bankruptcy risk, these factors are
unambiguously under the control of the plan sponsor. Failure to adjust
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95. Pennacchi (2006, p. 27).
96. CBO (2005b, p. 14).
97. In this case, as discussed more fully below, budget accounting could be performed
by recognizing as an outlay the difference between the full economic cost of plan termination
insurance and actual premiums paid.
98. Boyce and Ippolito (2002, pp. 140–41).premiums to those two risks at the level of the individual plan would
unnecessarily continue to give scope for moral hazard to distort the behavior
of plan sponsors.
Taking these considerations on board, what could be done to move
the system toward rational risk-based pricing of default insurance? Thus
far two detailed empirical models of the DB sector have been developed:
one described by Boyce and Ippolito and housed at the PBGC, the other
described by and housed at the CBO.
99 Although neither model may be
ready to bear such pressure today, both are highly credible, and either might
ultimately provide a suitable basis for setting risk-based premiums, espe-
cially once the reasons for some important differences between the two
models are better understood.
100 Research, development, and reﬁnement
of these models should continue so that either could become a vehicle for
setting premiums.
In moving toward market-based premiums, careful thought would have
to be given to the design of the transition. Going “cold turkey” to market-
based premiums could force some ﬁrms teetering on the brink of bank-
ruptcy, with deeply underfunded plans, over the edge. One way to minimize
unnecessary bankruptcies would be to phase in market-based premiums
linearly over the same ﬁve- or seven-year period allowed for amortization
of underfunding: In the ﬁrst year, assuming a ﬁve-year phase-in period,
the premium paid would be equal to one-ﬁfth of the market-based premium
plus four-ﬁfths of the current-law premium, and so forth. After ﬁve years,
when sponsors should have eliminated their current underfunding and
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99. Boyce and Ippolito (2002); CBO (2005b).
100. The discrepancy that most demands further investigation is the fact that, in the vintage
of the PBGC’s model described in Boyce and Ippolito (2002), current-law premiums were
judged to be too low by a factor of about two, whereas in the vintage of the CBO model
described in CBO (2005b), the required scaling factor is estimated to be about six. Some
convergence may already have occurred: in its 2004 annual report, the PBGC indicated that
the expected claims implied by its model had been revised up from about $800 million a
year to about $2 billion a year. Moreover, some portion of the remaining discrepancy seems
to reﬂect a few readily identiﬁable differences in underlying assumptions. For example, the
CBO assumes that the plans of all bankrupt ﬁrms are terminated, whereas the PBGC assumes
that only plans with funding ratios of less than 80 percent are terminated. Also, the CBO
model boosts plan liabilities by 20 percent at default, to reﬂect such considerations as the
ability of sponsors to “de-fund” the plan through various means, plus the tendency of retirees
at distressed ﬁrms to take subsidized early-retirement and lump-sum payments when available.
By contrast, the PBGC adjusts liability at termination directly and speciﬁcally for the additional
drain from subsidized early-retirement and lump-sum payments on a plan-by-plan basis.redeployed their assets to immunize the risk of their liabilities, the pricing
of insurance would fully compensate taxpayers for the risk they are bearing,
which would, at that point, be quite small. Another possibility would be to
delay the implementation of risk-based premiums altogether until the end
of the ﬁrst ﬁve-year (or seven-year) amortization period.
The Third Locus of Reform: Transparency
Transparency is considered here with respect to four separate constituen-
cies: workers, ﬁnancial markets, the PBGC, and taxpayers. Transparency
should be improved for each.101
REQUIREMENTS FOR DISCLOSURE TO WORKERS: CURRENT LAW. Under
current law, “only participants in plans below a certain funding threshold
receive annual notices regarding the funding status of their plans, and the
information plans must currently provide does not reﬂect how the plan’s
assets are invested.”
102 Sponsors are required to report in their annual Form
5500 ﬁling the proportion of plan assets invested in securities issued by
the sponsor. However, as the GAO has noted, this information is neither
timely nor “readily accessible to participants.”
103
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101. Yet another possible reform that could be a constructive part of the mix would be
to elevate the priority of the PBGC in bankruptcy proceedings. In principle, such a move
should cause other creditors to step up the pressure they apply on sponsors to fund their plans
prudently. Experience suggests, however, that it would not be a panacea, because clever
creditors can devise ways of extracting value from the corporation before the PBGC gets its
crack at the remainder. For example, Bodie and Merton (1993, p. 210) describe the case of
Republic Steel, which was acquired by LTV in 1984: “Four years before, the plan was under-
funded but it had about $300 million of assets. A year later senior ofﬁcers of Republic Steel,
some of whom were themselves approaching retirement age, changed the terms of the cash-out
option in 1981 so as to make it particularly attractive to take a lump sum in lieu of an annuity.
During the subsequent years preceding the merger, retiring employees (of Republic Steel)
exercised their cash-out option en masse. When LTV went bankrupt in 1986, the PBGC thus
found itself obligated to pay guaranteed beneﬁts on an essentially unfunded plan ($230 million
in liabilities and a trivial $7,700 in assets). Despite the obvious effect of the cash-out provision,
both the PBGC and the Department of Labor concluded there was no violation of the law.”
On page 214, Bodie and Merton go on to state more generally, “In the event of ﬁnancial
distress, the interests of subordinated creditors can diverge from those of the PBGC. Debt
instruments, such as corporate bonds, often offer creditors ways of withdrawing cash out of
a troubled institution before the guarantor can—high-coupon payments, call provisions,
sinking funds, and put-option provisions are examples.” These observations suggest that a
higher priority in bankruptcy could be a useful part of the overall belt-and-suspenders toolkit,
but should not be relied upon in isolation.
102. GAO (2003b, p. 17).
103. GAO (2003b, p. 17).REQUIREMENTS FOR DISCLOSURE TO WORKERS: PROPOSED REFORMS.
Care should be exercised neither to overburden workers with complex and
difﬁcult-to-understand ﬁnancial material, nor to overburden sponsors with
onerous compliance requirements. Two pieces of information that should
be easy for participants to understand and straightforward for sponsors
to prepare are, first, the present value of accrued benefits (useful to the
worker in comparing the plan with a deﬁned-contribution plan) and, sec-
ond, the fraction of accrued beneﬁts that would be funded if the plan were
to be terminated immediately. After the initial phase-in period of ﬁve or
seven years, most sponsors should be in a position to report a funding
ratio very close to 100 percent. Exceptions would include sponsors that
have granted improvements in plan parameters or increases in shutdown
or ﬂat-dollar beneﬁts, and that are contributing the minimum required
amounts to amortize the unfunded liabilities generated by those improve-
ments or increases. If plan assets are being used to immunize liability risk,
capital gains or losses should not be a source of material deviation from
100 percent funding, although other departures of actual experience from
actuarial assumptions could generate deviations from 100 percent funding.
ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS: CURRENT FASB REGULATION. As noted
above, current accounting requirements allow sponsors to assume a high
rate of return on pension assets, commensurate with a heavy allocation of
assets to risky assets, but then to smooth the associated volatility in actual
returns over five years. In effect, the rules create a form of accounting
arbitrage. Coronado and Sharpe show that investors seem to pay more heed
to the smoothed ﬁgures reported in the body of the ﬁnancial reports than
to the fair market values reported in the footnotes.
104 Similarly, Franzoni
and Marín show that ﬁrms with severely underfunded pension plans tend
to underperform the overall stock market.
105 Since 2003 some information
about asset allocation has been provided in the footnotes to the ﬁnancial
statements; however, this information is aggregated across all plans spon-
sored by the firm and provides only a very coarse breakdown of assets,
without, for example, any clarity about the duration or quality of fixed-
income securities. More recently, FASB has proposed to move within a
year to requiring that fair-market-value measures of assets and liabilities
be reported on the balance sheet, and to reconsider the appropriate treat-
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104. Coronado and Sharpe (2003).
105. Franzoni and Marín (2006).ment of pension expense in the income statement over the next two to
three years.
106
ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS: PROPOSED REFORMS. The general thrust
of today’s ﬁnancial accounting requirements, which feature accrual-based
concepts and allow ﬁrms to report a net pension expense (accrued expenses
less returns on assets), is sensible and economically appropriate. Within that
framework, however, two crucial adjustments would improve the value and
transparency of ﬁnancial information greatly, namely, building the calcu-
lation of all items around fair market values rather than allowing delayed
recognition of changes in assets and liabilities, and using the ABO concept
throughout. If ﬁrms deployed their pension assets so as to immunize their
interest rate risk, if demographic factors such as tenure and mortality played
out as expected, and if plan parameters were not changed, net pension
expense each period would equal benefits accruing during the period,
regardless of rates of return on ﬁnancial assets or changes in the shape or
level of the term structure of interest. Information about asset allocation
should be released on a timely basis and at the level of the individual plan,
and should include greater detail about the quality and duration of ﬁxed-
income securities held by each plan.
DISCLOSURE TO THE PBGC: CURRENT LAW. Firms are required in their
annual Form 5500 ﬁlings to provide some information about their liabilities
and assets, but that ﬁling need not take place until 9
1⁄2 months after the
close of the plan year. On that form the estimate of plan liabilities is as of
the beginning of the plan year; therefore by the time the PBGC receives
the information it is almost two years old. Asset data on Schedule H of the
form are as of both the beginning and the end of the plan year, which means
that information about the holdings of the plan is nearly one year out of
date by the time the PBGC receives it. Moreover, the information on the
form does not, as a practical matter, allow the PBGC to parse the assets
held in pools, trusts, and mutual funds into their fundamental components
(that is, speciﬁc forms of bonds, equities, and so forth).
DISCLOSURE TO THE PBGC: PROPOSED REFORMS. To allow it to effec-
tively monitor and enforce the asset allocation requirements proposed here,
the PBGC would need synchronous information on assets and liabilities
on a far timelier basis than occurs under current law. The information pro-
vided under current FASB requirements would not be sufﬁcient, because the
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106. FASB (2006).PBGC would need data at the level of the individual plan as well as more
detail on the characteristics of the assets in each plan, including information
on the quality and duration of bonds.
BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF THE PBGC: CURRENT LAW. Revenue to the
federal government from the PBGC is currently deﬁned to include premium
income as well as the investment income of the revolving fund (the recep-
tacle of premium income and immediate source of beneﬁt payments) but
not the investment income of the trust fund (the receptacle of assets taken
over from sponsors of terminated plans). Outlays are defined to include
the portion of beneﬁt payments and administrative expenses deemed not
covered by assets assumed by the PBGC. Thus the net long-term obligation
assumed by the PBGC upon termination of a plan is reﬂected in the budget
only over time, not at the moment of termination, much less before then,
as the fortunes of insured plans deteriorate. A consequence of the current
treatment is that the PBGC has been shown as having reduced the uniﬁed
federal deﬁcit by billions of dollars thus far, despite having accumulated a
substantially negative net worth.
BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF THE PBGC: PROPOSED REFORMS. One way
to improve the budgetary treatment of the PBGC would be to score the
economic subsidy delivered through the PBGC as an outlay. The subsidy
could be calculated as the difference between the full economic cost of plan
termination insurance and actual premiums paid.
107 Scoring the PBGC in
this manner would, in effect, extend the reach of the Credit Reform Act to
insurance programs; currently the methods prescribed under that act are
applied only to loans and loan guarantee programs.
108
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107. CBO (2005c, p. 9) describes an approach along these lines.
108. The approach recommended here would treat the federal government as liable for
all obligations taken on by the PBGC, despite the fact that, under current law, the PBGC is
not backed by the full faith and credit of the Treasury and therefore is liable only for obliga-
tions that it can pay out of current-law resources. (CBO, 2005d, p. 5, notes this issue.) Thus,
under this budgetary treatment, legislation to back the PBGC with the full faith and credit
of the Treasury would be scored as having zero budgetary cost. Unattractive as that conse-
quence is, however, the alternative may be worse. For example, if, under an accrual-type
method, PBGC-related spending authority were interpreted as strictly limited to amounts
that could be ﬁnanced out of current-law resources, then all further plan terminations would
be scored as having zero budget implications over the long term (additional outlays in the
near term would be offset by reduced outlays in the longer term once the PBGC’s current-
law resources have been exhausted), because the PBGC is already projected to become
insolvent.Looking Ahead: Must the Government Remain the Provider 
of Pension Insurance Forever?
Most pension analysts agree that the government should play some
role in enhancing the security of retirement income derived from DB
plans.
109 The argument for government intervention in some form derives
in part from suspicions that neither workers nor financial market partici-
pants would be sufficiently well informed or sophisticated about pension
finances to provide effective market discipline in a fully deregulated
environment. It derives as well from doubts about whether workers would
be well positioned to bear the risk associated with uninsured pension
promises, and from concerns that workers and firms might expose them-
selves to more risk on the assumption that society would provide some
form of financial backstop to DB participants even in the absence of a
formal insurance program.
Some analysts, while agreeing that some form of government interven-
tion is warranted, have argued that the current form of intervention, in
which the government acts as the provider of plan termination insurance,
is not the most appropriate one. For example, Bodie has stated that “eco-
nomic reasoning establishes a rationale for insuring deﬁned-beneﬁt pen-
sions against the risk that the plan sponsor will default on its promise to
provide beneﬁts. It does not establish a rationale for the government to
provide such insurance. The federal government is probably not in the
best position to carry out such a task [emphasis in the original].”
110 In the
vision put forward by Bodie and others, the government would continue
to mandate that sponsors obtain plan termination insurance, but govern-
ment itself would not provide that insurance; instead it would be provided
by private insurers.
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109. One of the few analysts who leaves his views ambiguous in this regard is Pesando
(1996, pp. 286–88). He notes that if workers were well informed and ﬁnancially sophisticated,
government might not need to intervene at all, because workers would discount the value of
promised future pension beneﬁts to an appropriate extent in light of the ﬁnancial health of
the sponsor and the funding condition of the plan, and would adjust their demands with
respect to current wages accordingly. Through a process of self-selection, workers could also
sort themselves across ﬁrms, with the more risk-averse workers choosing to work for more
ﬁnancially sound ﬁrms with better-funded pension plans.
110. Bodie (1996, p. 20).In part, the case for private provision rests on the view that it would
reinforce the full risk-based pricing of plan termination insurance.
111 Left
unfettered, private insurers could take into account the risk factors that are
largely or completely ignored under the structure of insurance premiums
allowed under current law. Sponsors would face the full economic conse-
quences of their actions with respect to their plans, and so would be moti-
vated to take on only the economically appropriate amount of risk in those
plans. In return, private insurers could provide coverage of all promised
beneﬁts—not just those falling beneath an arbitrarily determined cap—and
healthy plan sponsors could be assured of not having to subsidize the cov-
erage provided to their shakier counterparts.
One way to introduce a system based on private provision would be to
implement the reforms outlined in the preceding section. After those
reforms have been fully phased in and any transition period has passed, the
risks presented to any insurer—government or private—should have been
vastly reduced. Boyce and Ippolito note, for example, that the scale and
dispersion of risks under a reformed regulatory structure would much
more closely resemble other forms of coverage currently provided by pri-
vate insurers.
112 At that point, if the system were functioning as intended,
a switchover to private provision could be implemented with little or no
discontinuity.
Some analysts have recommended an even more aggressive approach, in
which private provision would be a ﬁrst step in the reform process rather
than a last step. For example, Carolyn Weaver has argued that “the govern-
ment should simply surrender its position as monopoly supplier of pension
insurance and shift the insurance (or guarantee) function to the private
sector.”
113 One prominent exponent of an aggressive approach has been
Richard Ippolito, who was serving as chief economist of the PBGC when
his 1987 article propounding this point of view was published and who
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111. This approach would put insurance companies, rather than workers or shareholders,
in the position of enforcing market discipline and thus provides a plausible answer to the
observation that workers and even equity investors seem to have considerable difﬁculty
accurately processing information about DB plans.
112. Boyce and Ippolito (2002).
113. Weaver (1997, p. 156). Weaver (1997, note 100) cites Pesando (1982), Sharpe (1976),
and Smalhout (1993) as also supporting private provision of plan termination insurance, or
“risk-based premiums brought about (in whole or in part) though private supply.”has reiterated that view more recently.
114An important impediment to
implementing an aggressive approach would be the need to design a pru-
dent transition. Indeed, even proponents of an aggressive approach might
end up adopting a reform program along the lines sketched in the preceding
section as a bridge to their preferred outcome.
Support for private provision of plan termination insurance is hardly
universal. Some who have taken the opposing point of view have argued
that the PBGC as currently constituted provides an important form of social
insurance, cushioning workers and ﬁrms from adverse economic develop-
ments. Moreover, in providing such cushioning, the PBGC encourages
both workers and ﬁrms to be open to the risks inherent in a ﬂuid, dynamic
economy such as ours. Far from promoting economic efﬁciency, a move
to limit the ability of the PBGC to provide social insurance would, in the
view of these analysts, risk a backlash that could result in much more
damaging constraints being placed on the economy. In the words of Dallas
Salisbury, “Agree or not, Congress intended a social insurance model—
that is, explicit subsidy within the deﬁned beneﬁt system.”
115 Salisbury goes
on to say, “The program was legislatively established with social insurance
goals. A move to the casualty insurance model may well be justiﬁed, but
it carries with it a fundamental change of mission. Too many analysts fail
to begin their work with an articulation of why Congress was wrong and
why they should change the mission. Instead, they analyze the program
against a casualty model and declare the program in need of reform. By
so doing, they confuse rather than enlighten....   The present mission is
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114. Ippolito (1987, p. 22) wrote as follows: “Implementation of any one of these policies
[charging economically fair premiums, boosting the standing of the PBGC in bankruptcy
proceedings, and so forth] would substantially reduce the inefﬁciencies in the pension
insurance system. The problem generally is that these solutions would take a long time to
become fully effective. Another approach would be to simply eliminate the PBGC, while
retaining a sufﬁcient portion of expected transfers to make the change politically feasible.
This could be done by requiring termination of pension plans as of some announced date as
a condition for PBGC coverage. Pension promises outstanding at the time of termination
would be vested in nominal terms and guaranteed by the PBGC, as under present law, while
new pension promises, including indexation of terminated beneﬁts to future wages, would
accrue under the new pension plans. All continuing plans either would be exempt from
insurance coverage or would be required to purchase insurance at market rates in the 
private sector.”
115. Salisbury (1996, p. 313).social insurance. Against that mission the PBGC has been a very successful
agency.”
116
Leaving aside the normative question of whether the PBGC should have
a social insurance role as part of its mission, it is worth noting that the
insurance-related characteristics of the overall DB system arguably would
not be altered greatly under the approach suggested here. Under that
approach, employees of distressed ﬁrms could be paid virtually all their
accrued beneﬁts, and a ﬁrm experiencing ﬁnancial distress would still 
be able—as under current law—to lighten its financial load by shedding
pension-related expenses, although under the proposed approach it would
do so by terminating a fully funded plan rather than by causing a deeply
underfunded plan to become a public obligation. A system designed along
these lines would not involve any announcement that substantial new
resources have been directed toward the employees of a certain failing
ﬁrm, for the simple reason that a funding gap would never have been
allowed to emerge.
Conclusion
The reform program proposed in this paper addresses each of the short-
comings of the current system identiﬁed in the introduction. Whereas the
current system exposes some workers to ﬁnancial risks that they seem ill
prepared to hedge, the reformed system would render the pension promise
essentially free of risk. Similarly, whereas the current system creates scope
for moral hazard by tolerating gross mispricing of insurance and misleading
reporting of pension activity in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial statements, the reformed
system would ensure that taxpayers are fully and fairly compensated for
the risk they bear and that investors are provided with transparent, market-
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116. Salisbury (1996, pp. 315–16). Weaver (1997, p. 154), among others, disagrees stren-
uously that the PBGC should aim to play any social insurance role: “Mixed insurance-transfer
programs—euphemistically referred to as ‘social insurance’ by proponents—inevitably
distort the allocation of resources in the economy and are notoriously poor at targeting
scarce resources. In PBGC’s case, the system subsidizes wages in failing ﬁrms, artiﬁcially
prolonging the life of inefﬁcient ﬁrms at the expense of efﬁcient ones; encourages ﬁrms
with a greater likelihood of failure to offer compensation in the form of unfunded pension
promises the PBGC will likely pay; and, by weakening unions’ stake in the long-term viability
of ﬁrms, makes capital investment in these ﬁrms less attractive.”value-based information about pension assets and liabilities. The much
greater transparency of a system founded on certainty and clarity should
also substantially improve the accuracy with which asset prices reﬂect avail-
able information about DB pension plans. Under the reformed system, the
government-sponsored insurance program would stop providing subsidized
insurance coverage, and healthy sponsors would be substantially free of the
risk of having to subsidize the risky pension promises of ﬁrms with risky
pension portfolios and low funding ratios. Finally, the plan proposed here
would greatly reduce the complexity that suffuses nearly every aspect of
the regulations now governing DB plans.
The payoff to a successful reform could be substantial. Workers could
be guaranteed the full amount of their promised beneﬁts rather than an
arbitrarily capped amount. Taxpayers could be relieved of the threat of
signiﬁcant further growth in an already-considerable contingent liability.
Sponsors could operate within a system that is far more transparent and
imposes lower costs of compliance, and the ﬁnancially healthy ﬁrms among
them could be freed of the risk of having to subsidize their shakier counter-
parts. In that event, workers and firms could evaluate the pros and cons
of DB plans on their economic merits and decide whether—and to what
extent—the DB promise should be part of the preferred overall compen-
sation package.
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Discussion
Jeffrey R. Brown: David Wilcox’s paper on the Pension Beneﬁt Guar-
anty Corporation and its reform is a pleasure to read. Despite the enor-
mous complexity of the topic, this paper provides a thorough, careful, and
clear description of the many problems that are deeply embedded in the
structure of the nation’s deﬁned-beneﬁt pension system.
In addition to describing the problems with great clarity, Wilcox takes the
bold next step of making normative policy recommendations about how to
reform the system. To the many interest groups that have a direct ﬁnancial
stake in the future of the PBGC, these policy recommendations will be seen
as provocative, both relative to the status quo and relative to the reforms that
will likely be enacted. Indeed, as an economist with a strong preference for
market-based solutions, I must confess that my own initial reaction to the
paper (based on an initial, cursory read) was that the proposals seemed
heavy handed: they mandate solutions for nearly every aspect of pension
plan funding, including in which assets a plan may choose to invest.
After reading the paper carefully, however, I realized that these propos-
als follow perfectly from the analysis. Indeed, it is hard to argue with them
at all if one accepts Wilcox’s three axioms plus one further condition. The
three axioms that Wilcox identiﬁes are that workers should be able to view
their DB pension as risk-free, that taxpayers should be fully compensated
for any risk they bear, and that low-risk sponsors should not have to subsi-
dize high-risk sponsors. Anyone who rejects any of these axioms will also
likely have a different view about the appropriate policy response.
The additional condition, which these proposals implicitly assume, is that
reform efforts should be focused on making the PBGC work, as opposed to
scrapping it completely and replacing it with something altogether different
286(such as mandatory private DB insurance). Given that this is a politically
realistic condition, at least in the short run, the Wilcox proposals may be
viewed as a good standard against which other reform proposals should be
evaluated. Although Wilcox does brieﬂy mention the idea of private insur-
ance as a possible last step in the reform process, a case can be made that it
should be the ﬁrst and possibly the only step.
The natural starting point for any economist thinking about government
intervention is to ask, “What is the market failure that the PBGC was
designed to address?” After all, if consumers were fully rational, forward
looking, and well informed, there would be very little need for government
intervention. Firms and workers would negotiate an optimal compensation
contract, and ﬁrms that credibly committed to a less risky DB promise would
be able to provide lower compensation than would ﬁrms with a riskier
promise. Barring market failure, the equilibrium outcome would be efﬁcient.
The market failure here seems to be that the average worker is not fully
rational, forward looking, and well informed. Given the increasing body of
evidence suggesting that average workers have a low level of ﬁnancial liter-
acy,
1 and that they make optimization mistakes even in much simpler con-
texts,
2 it is reasonable to think that the average worker is unable to fully
process the information required to assess the risk of his or her pension plan.
Indeed, given how complex the required calculations are, it is probably
unreasonable to think that anyone outside of a small subset of experts could
make an appropriate assessment of the risk of a given DB plan. After all, it is
not enough to know the net present value of plan assets and liabilities. One
must also know about the stochastic properties of both the assets and the lia-
bilities, the future funding behavior of the plan sponsor, the distribution of
plan sponsor insolvency risk, and how these factors are correlated with the
individual’s marginal utility of income in future states of the world.
Of course, even if one accepts that most workers have inadequate infor-
mation or suffer from bounded rationality, it does not necessarily follow
that the solution is for the government to insure private DB plans. There
are other, less intrusive steps that could provide DB participants with pen-
sion security while simultaneously providing market discipline to ensure
that ﬁrms have appropriate incentives to fund their plans. One limited
approach would be to combine stronger and more uniform disclosure rules
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1. See, for example, John Hancock Financial Services (2002).
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with stronger protections for accrued pension beneﬁts as part of bankruptcy
proceedings. The logic is that long-term pension promises are a form of
debt for the employer. If this debt were given seniority over the employer’s
other liabilities—including those to its bondholders—in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, pension participants would have at least some limited amount of
protection in the event of the employer’s bankruptcy. Bondholders, includ-
ing sophisticated institutional investors, would also have the incentive to
ensure that pension promises are fully funded, so as to avoid having that
funding risk imposed on them; for example, they could require as part of
their debt covenants that the employer purchase private insurance for its DB
pension plan.
Of course, such an approach does not make the pension promise risk
free. According to one study,
3 from 1981 to 2000 the average default recov-
ery rate from senior secured bonds of all ratings was approximately 54 per-
cent. Even if pension promises could typically be recovered at a higher rate,
they would still impose risk on participants. In addition, a voluntary market
for pension insurance might suffer failures of its own, such as from asym-
metric information. Moreover, the experience of Republic Steel, described
in a study by Zvi Bodie and Robert Merton cited by Wilcox,
4 suggests that
elevating the status of the PBGC in bankruptcy proceedings might not be
sufﬁcient in itself given the cleverness of plan sponsors in devising ways to
strip assets from the pension fund.
A somewhat more intrusive step would be for the federal government to
mandate private DB insurance coverage; this would force all plans into the
pension insurance market and thus avoid adverse selection. Private insur-
ers would then play the role of imposing appropriate funding discipline.
Insurers would set premiums to reﬂect the degree of risk, and plan spon-
sors would then have appropriate incentives to choose an optimal funding
and asset allocation strategy. To avoid problems of asymmetric informa-
tion, employers would have to be compelled to provide insurers with all
necessary information about plan assets and liabilities, and insurers would
be permitted to price premiums differently according to risk.
This, however, was not the path chosen by Congress in 1974. Instead
the government chose to be the direct provider of the insurance itself. It is
not clear that this was the best decision, nor is it clear that Congress could
3. Hamilton, Gupton, and Berhault (2001).
4. Bodie and Merton (1993).not unwind the existing system and adopt mandatory private insurance if
the political will existed to do so. The recent debates over PBGC reform,
however, suggest that this is politically unrealistic, at least in the short run.
Initial conditions matter in politics as well as in economics, and given the
interests of current players, it seems implausible that the PBGC system
will be abandoned anytime soon. Given this situation, Wilcox wisely con-
centrates on a more focused set of questions, namely,
—What is the state of health of the DB pension system in the United
States today?
—How well is the PBGC performing its job now?
—What reforms would make it better?
With regard to the ﬁrst question, it is well known that the DB system is in
signiﬁcant distress, and the paper does a thorough job of documenting this.
What is less understood by the public, but expertly explained in the paper,
is why the plans are in trouble in the ﬁrst place. To read the popular press
and industry trade publications, it would appear that the main problem is
the “perfect storm” that coalesced in the early 2000s: falling interest rates
increased the present value of pension plan liabilities at the same time that
falling equity prices shrank the asset base for most DB pensions. As a
result, the ratio of plan assets to plan liabilities dropped substantially over
a few years.
This explanation is unsatisfying, for at least two reasons. First, many
DB pension plans were experiencing funding problems before the perfect
storm appeared. To be sure, declining interest rates and stock prices made
the problem much worse, but they did not create it. Second, because asset
price ﬂuctuations are an everyday occurrence, the more important question
is why ﬁrms chose to expose themselves to this risk in the ﬁrst place.
Although possible explanations abound for why ﬁrms fail to insulate them-
selves from pension funding risk, Wilcox’s paper can be interpreted as
pointing to the PBGC itself as a leading candidate.
The intent of the lawmakers who created the PBGC was to reduce risk.
Established as part of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in
1974, the PBGC was designed to enforce pension funding requirements to
ensure that plan sponsors set aside sufﬁcient assets to meet their future lia-
bilities. In addition, the PBGC serves as a DB insurer, guaranteeing that
retirees will receive their retirement beneﬁts (up to a speciﬁed maximum)
even in the event that the plan sponsor goes bankrupt with an unfunded
pension plan.
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Wilcox divides the many problems with the structure of the existing system
into three broad categories. The ﬁrst set of problems is that current funding
rules are inadequate. For example, ﬁrms are required to fund only 90 percent
of their pension liability, they are not required to use riskless discount rates
despite the fact that the liabilities are relatively certain, they can use various
smoothing and amortization methods to alter their annual contributions, and
more. The net effect is that ﬁrms can claim to be fully funded even though
their true termination liability vastly exceeds their available assets.
A second category of problems is the nearly complete lack of risk adjust-
ment. The standard PBGC premium is based on the number of employees
covered by the plan. There is no consideration of beneﬁt generosity, the
ﬁrm’s credit quality, the risk-return characteristics of the plan portfolio, or
the degree of mismatch between the plan’s assets and the ﬁrm’s liability
structure in different states of the world. In the extreme, a plan that chose to
invest 100 percent of its assets in an emerging markets stock fund would face
no higher premium than one that chose to invest 100 percent in nominal
bonds with durations that exactly match its liabilities. The PBGC variable-
rate premium, which is essentially a ﬁxed-rate fee applied to the amount of
underfunding, also ignores most of the relevant risk factors.
The third category of problems is that the information disclosure required
under current law is inadequate and confusing. Funding information, such as
that ﬁled on Form 5500, is provided with a long lag, and even then not in a
format that participants can easily digest. Furthermore, the rules govern-
ing the liability concept used, the discount rate, and the use of smoothing
mechanisms differ across the PBGC, the Treasury, and ﬁnancial account-
ing standards.
Wilcox’s proposed reforms are designed to tackle all three of these prob-
lems. On the funding front, he would require that the accumulated beneﬁt
obligation (his preferred measure of plan liability) be calculated using some-
thing approximating a risk-free term structure, which would clearly be an
improvement over current law given that the accrued liabilities are relatively
riskless (except for demographic risk). Firms would be required to hold all-
bond portfolios with durations that matched that of the liabilities. Other use-
ful provisions would eliminate the gaming that occurs when ﬁrms are
permitted to provide new beneﬁts when the plan is underfunded.
To better align incentives, the Wilcox reform suggests moving to risk-
based premiums. I wholeheartedly endorse this concept: indeed, if the gov-
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other funding restrictions would prove redundant. Nonetheless, I am highly
skeptical that the government is capable of implementing this approach. As
Joseph Stiglitz has pointed out,
5 the government “faces a tremendous disad-
vantage in assessing risks and charging premiums based on risk differ-
ences.” Attempts to differentiate among ﬁrms, industries, or regions based
on risk characteristics would lead to political maneuvering, as, for example,
senators from Michigan seek to protect Detroit automakers. Furthermore, as
George Pennacchi has noted in the context of deposit insurance,
6 were the
government to charge the correct market premium, it would earn account-
ing proﬁts on average, because it is being fully compensated for risk. Such
an approach is unlikely to be politically sustainable.
Although I am inclined to believe that a government-mandated, but pri-
vately provided, DB pension insurance system would be preferable to the
Wilcox reforms. I also believe that, conditional on having a government-
administered pension insurance system, the Wilcox reforms are eminently
sensible. They are designed to reduce DB participant risk, limit taxpayer
exposure, and properly align ﬁrm incentives.
Before fully embracing the Wilcox reforms, however, it is worth con-
sidering one possible consequence that Wilcox himself appears to dismiss
a bit too quickly. Because these reforms would rationalize the pension
funding process, ﬁrms would lose the government subsidy they implicitly
receive today. As a result, these reforms would likely hasten the shift from
a DB to a DC (deﬁned-contribution) system. For many reasons, this may
be the efﬁcient outcome.
But if it is indeed true that individual workers lack the training, ﬁnancial
acumen, and foresight to make perfect ﬁnancial decisions—which, after all,
appears to be the primary rationale for having a PBGC in the ﬁrst place—
then it should be noted that most 401(k) plans are not yet optimally designed
to account for workers’ lack of ﬁnancial sophistication. Although there is a
growing movement toward designing 401(k) plans so as to make them suit-
able even for such unsophisticated investors, a number of hurdles remain.
For example, approximately three-quarters of 401(k) plans do not even offer
participants an option to take their withdrawals in the form of a lifetime
annuity; this omission may leave many retirees inefﬁciently exposed to
David W. Wilcox 291
5. Stiglitz (1993, p. 114).
6. Pennacchi (2006).longevity risk.7 In such a second-best world, where the alternative to a
poorly designed DB system is itself not adequately designed, one cannot
be absolutely certain that reforming the PBGC to remove the implicit sub-
sidy will necessarily lead to better overall retirement security.
In that case, although enactment of any reforms resembling the Wilcox
proposals would be an important positive step, policymakers should not be
content with just “ﬁxing the PBGC.” They should also reform the DC sys-
tem to ensure that it provides a secure source of retirement income for all
workers. And if and when policymakers are prepared to make such changes,
I hope to read another David Wilcox paper on how it should be done.
Douglas Holtz-Eakin: David Wilcox has delivered an outstanding paper,
and a very timely one. The Financial Accounting Standards Board has just
issued its proposed revisions to accounting for pension plans, and the House-
Senate conference committee is moving toward a ﬁnal version of pension
reform legislation even as I write these remarks.
Certainly there is a problem with the status quo. A quick survey of the
deﬁned-beneﬁt pension world reveals a lot of underfunding by sponsors—
on the order of $450 billion for single-employer plans alone. In addition,
the federal guarantor, the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation, is deep
under water in any economic sense. Yet nobody broke the law. So we have
a problem.
The caveat to this assertion, of course, is that maybe workers are engaged
in some very sophisticated hedges that we cannot observe and so are immu-
nized to this problem, but I don’t think so. For that reason I concur with
Wilcox that the pension promise should be riskless. To my eye, pension
beneﬁts are compensation earned at one point in time but paid at a later
one. The public policy goal is to build a very secure bridge through time
for this compensation so that the workers actually receive it.
Before turning to Wilcox’s approach to doing so, let me note that making
pensions riskless to the workers means that some other group or entity has
to bear the risk. If it ends up being the taxpayers, then I again concur with
Wilcox that another policy objective should be to ensure that they are com-
pensated for their exposure to risk. During my tenure at the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce, we undertook a number of efforts to present to the Congress
the budgetary consequences of recognizing market risk in ﬁnancial trans-
actions involving the government: in the PBGC (using formal ﬁnancial
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7. See, for example, Brown and Warshawsky (2004).models), in Social Security reform involving individual accounts (using
stochastic simulations), in the Federal Housing Administration, in student
loan guarantees, in the America West Airlines loan guarantee, and in deposit
insurance. One lesson that I learned was that ﬁnancial risk is a very abstract
consideration to most members of Congress. Indeed, even among econo-
mists there is far from a consensus on how best to proceed. The combina-
tion is even more daunting: confused congresspeople turn to professional
experts and receive conﬂicting guidance. Introducing budgetary recognition
of market risk will be a hard sell.
But taking full account of risk is very important on a prospective basis,
because there is already a large legacy overhang of unfunded pension guar-
antees. I agree with Wilcox that the taxpayer is likely going to end up pick-
ing up the tab for this legacy. It would be desirable to minimize the
potential of repeating this experience in the future.
Let me now focus my comments on three areas: exposition, reforms,
and politics. First, I commend David Wilcox for an expositional tour de
force. Two aspects of the paper in particular—the sterling “crash course”
in DB pensions and the anatomy of a plan failure—are ﬁrst-rate pieces of
exposition. I think the latter is especially important because there has been
a lot of talk in recent years that the current distress in the pension system is
the result of a “perfect storm”: an unusual coincidence of interest rates
falling just as stock prices were also going down. The reality is that the sit-
uation does not stem from a perfect storm, and that in the absence of policy
changes these failures will recur, because plans are not fully funded and
pension insurance is badly underpriced.
Next, consider the reforms that Wilcox proposes. The heart of the paper
is the combination of theory and proposed reforms. Wilcox makes a con-
vincing case that the goal should be to compute liability (deﬁned as the accu-
mulated beneﬁt obligation) using a yield curve approach, quickly amortize
any underfunding regardless of its source, and invest pension assets in
bonds that match the maturity structure of the liability. What kind of reforms
would yield this outcome? Wilcox groups them into three areas.
The ﬁrst area (or locus, to use Wilcox’s term) comprises funding require-
ments, limitations on beneﬁt increases, and portfolio investment restric-
tions. Wilcox proposes that “To minimize the risk presented to workers,
taxpayers, and healthy sponsors . . . sponsors should be required to fund
beneﬁt accruals each year plus amortize any shortfalls or surpluses over a
reasonably short period, all on a mark-to-market basis.”
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especially important that assets and liabilities be marked to market, that all
sources of underfunding be treated equally, and that real resources be used
to offset any underfunding. A large part of the problem to date has been the
divergence between the accounting of pension plans and their actual eco-
nomic status; this strategy ensures their alignment.
The second area involves the pricing of PBGC insurance. PBGC insur-
ance is too cheap on average and is not priced to reﬂect the risks imposed on
the taxpayer.
1 Wilcox proposes revamping the system to address this short-
coming. Here there are three issues. First, it makes sense to cover adminis-
trative expenses with a base premium scaled to each plan sponsor’s insured
liability.
Second, insurance should be priced to compensate for plan-speciﬁc risk.
As Wilcox points out, if the rest of his proposed reforms are also imple-
mented, then plans that are fully funded and that have invested so as to
hedge the risk of plan liabilities will expose the PBGC to no risk and should
pay no additional premium. All others should.
Developing ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk measures is a Herculean undertaking. The
Congressional Budget Ofﬁce’s analysis of adding a risk-based element to
the current premiums identiﬁed two roughly comparable approaches: tying
the premium to the creditworthiness of the sponsor, and tying it to the frac-
tion of plan assets held in risky equities. If Wilcox’s other reforms work as
proposed, the latter will not be an issue. Instead the only risk is that under-
funding will not be eliminated, and this is presumably captured by tying the
premium to the sponsor’s credit rating.
The ﬁnal issue is whether premiums should cover market risk. Every
other ﬁnancial market participant demands compensation for systematic
risk, but the federal government ignores the cost of such risk in evaluating
its programs. The practical implication of incorporating market risk into
the PBGC’s premiums, as Wilcox points out (borrowing from George
Pennacchi), is that the insurance program would not break even on aver-
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1. In principle, taxpayers face no risk from PBGC shortfalls. Beneﬁt guarantees are to
be paid out of accumulated premiums and the assets of failed plans. If these are insufﬁcient,
beneﬁciaries would receive reduced pensions. As Wilcox notes, the law governing the
PBGC explicitly does not oblige the U.S. government to be the pension provider of last
resort. In practice, however, it is universally agreed that Congress would step in and pro-
vide new funding before pensions were cut.age but instead would build a surplus. This is entirely sensible, but again
it will be a hard sell to members of Congress who might view an ever-
accumulating PBGC net worth as evidence that its insurance has been
overpriced.
With regard to transparency, I believe Wilcox has it right on the mark:
more transparency is a key to lasting reform. And I cannot help but
endorse changing the current budgetary treatment of the PBGC, which
yields nothing but confusion and poor budgetary incentives.
Finally, are Wilcox’s proposals robust to the politics of pension reform?
As I mentioned above, the Congress is now working toward comprehensive
pension reform, and so one might think that these proposals should be an
element of the debate. Unfortunately, they are dead on arrival.
That is a shame, because pension reform is an infrequent event and it
would be nice to get it right. Moreover, all of the key elements that Wilcox
addresses—yield curve approaches to liability, risk-based premiums, port-
folio restrictions, transparency—are part of the debate. But his approach
runs counter to the legislative tide in three ways.
First, the reforms he proposes are an interlocking, comprehensive whole.
Risk-based premiums are made easy because underfunding should be
greatly reduced and portfolios restructured to hedge the key risks. Trans-
parency is enhanced by focusing on a single measure of liability and elimi-
nating accounting gimmicks such as credit balances. And so forth. In short,
Wilcox has served up a choice, well-trimmed piece of policy steak. But the
legislative process prefers sausage.
Second, too many pension reform participants want more risk and more
time. Plan sponsors want to gamble on equity appreciation to make up
their current underfunding, and legislators want to give them more time to
get their house in order. In my view, neither impulse is correct, but both are
important elements of the political landscape, and Wilcox’s proposals run
directly against them.
Finally, Wilcox’s reforms are one-size-ﬁts-all, and they should be. But a
quick reading of the pension reforms that have passed the House and Senate
reveals myriad special and targeted provisions—the most egregious being
the two decades given to airlines to make up underfunding.
In short, these reforms are simply not going to go directly from the
Brookings panel to Congress’ ear. But Wilcox has served the policy process
well by providing a clear exposition of the problem, a coherent, internally
consistent set of objectives, and a roadmap to real pension reform.
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workers should be able to view the promise of a DB pension as free of risk.
He noted that in the Social Security debate it had become obvious that,
despite all attempts to diversify risk, the system will never be entirely risk-
less. Richard Cooper went further, arguing that uncertainty is part of life
and that people over a certain age should be expected to think ahead and
protect themselves.
Edmund Phelps discussed the connections between DB plans and inno-
vation by ﬁrms. Innovations expose employees to additional uncertainty
about their jobs, which they may be happy to bear since it may be advanta-
geous for their jobs. But DB plans expose them to the additional uncertainty
that comes with bankruptcy if the innovation is not fruitful and beneﬁt guar-
antees are incomplete. He saw a second connection through the effect that
such failures have on the incentives for future innovations. Since beneﬁt
guarantees are costly, past failures raise the costs that potentially innovative
ﬁrms must bear in the future. More generally, Phelps noted that if innova-
tions add to uncertainty, sparing one stakeholder from risk must necessarily
raise the risk faced by others.
Several panelists discussed the usefulness of DB plans and the implica-
tions of their decline. Gary Burtless observed that the DB plan is a strange
addition to the labor compensation package in that, under most plans, a
worker’s accrual of ﬁnancial claims is astoundingly nonlinear over the terms
of her service. Beneﬁt accruals are part of compensation. If the employee
works for the required number of years and attains the age requirement of the
plan, she enjoys substantial beneﬁts. But if she leaves her job before then,
either voluntarily or involuntarily, the beneﬁts she receives are sharply lower
than the accrued value of compensation already contributed. And if she
keeps working after meeting the age and service requirements for drawing a
pension, she receives a sharply lower compensation rate. Burtless raised the
question of why the government and disinterested taxpayers should insure
DB plans with such features. One reason, he noted, is that the PBGC is
expected to provide useful ﬁnancial regulation, helping investors under-
stand the liabilities their company faces and helping workers understand the
risks entailed in their compensation package. But he noted that most work-
ers fail to understand that their greatest risk is of an interruption in their ser-
vice before they meet the age and service requirements for full beneﬁts.
Burtless agreed that many of the changes suggested by Wilcox would
be useful in the long run, but also that the thorough overhaul he proposed
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simple improvement to current rules: the PBGC should not insure addi-
tional pension credits for ﬁrms whose pension funds are underfunded by
more than a certain percentage. He reasoned that this would be less polit-
ically controversial than many of the other proposals.
Alan Blinder suggested that Burtless’ criticisms of present plans do not
apply to the general concept of DB plans, but only to some peculiar features
of them that have become the norm. He reminded the panel that Social
Security beneﬁts do not have the nonlinear accrual feature of most private
DB plans. An important question is whether to try to ﬁx the troublesome
features of DB plans, which have been favored as a way to relieve workers
of investment risk. If the answer is no, Blinder reasoned, this would be a
further argument for preserving the DB nature of Social Security and pos-
sibly for making Social Security’s share in the typical employee’s retire-
ment package larger rather than smaller. He, too, agreed that the wholesale
changes for reforming DB plans suggested by Wilcox were politically
unlikely to be adopted, but he reasoned that mandating private insurance for
DB plans deserved consideration once a solution to the large, immediate
problems of the PBGC had been addressed.
Cooper declared himself sympathetic to Blinder’s suggestion about
strengthening the retirement safety net but noted that this could be done
with an alternative system, one that had at its core a deﬁned-contribution
plan but also provided social insurance should an individual’s retirement
income fall below a certain threshold. If such insurance could be provided,
he favored pushing the entire pension system toward deﬁned-contribution
plans. Cooper also observed that other parts of the nation’s retirement sys-
tem shared the strange beneﬁt accrual features that Burtless had described
for DB pensions. The military pension system provides no vesting for up to
twenty years of service and then vests 100 percent. He claimed that such a
system is unsustainable in today’s world and has to be changed.
Benjamin Friedman considered how the demise of the DB pension sys-
tem might affect workers’ ability to annuitize their non-Social Security
wealth. He noted that although many private group plans do provide useful
annuities, the market for individual annuities does not function well because
of adverse selection. If DB plans were largely to disappear, he argued,
public policy should devise a way to make such group annuities available
to all employees. Robert Gordon agreed that the analysis of DB plans
should be viewed in the broader context of other retirement and insurance
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away from DB plans would be a major problem involving costs that some-
one would have to bear.
Friedman also addressed the issue of legacy costs. He reasoned that these
costs are simply deferred payments for labor services, and economists
should be among the ﬁrst to point out that they are not conceptually differ-
ent from delayed payments for capital services. Anyone who thinks that a
ﬁrm in bankruptcy or even approaching bankruptcy should be obligated to
its debtors but relieved of its pension obligations is missing the point that
these are parallel obligations, and ﬁrms ought to be held responsible for
them in parallel fashion. George Perry remarked that no ﬁrm could have
predicted thirty years ago that their health care obligations would be as high
as they are today. Friedman agreed that the health care portion of the cost is
exceptionally large, but ﬁrms should be aware that they are exposing them-
selves to macroeconomic risk. If a ﬁrm ﬁnanced a plant by issuing a non-
callable bond, no one would support relieving the ﬁrm of its obligations to
the bondholders if interest rates fell. Gordon observed that both obligations
can be eliminated by bankruptcy. The question is whether the federal gov-
ernment has any role in insuring individual pensioners in a different way
than bondholders. James Duesenberry noted that pension design should rec-
ognize the fact that extreme, unforeseeable changes cannot be dealt with by
diversiﬁcation and insurance. The current problems with DB plans are con-
centrated in ﬁrms that in the 1950s and 1960s were large oligopolies, with
strong unions and without foreign competition. It was arguably impossible
that they could have insured against the changes in the world that have
taken place since then.
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